

Notes

Chapter 2

1. It is tempting to argue that this global/local split is a spatial replacement for an earlier temporal modern/traditional dichotomy, and that “glocal” now substitutes for “modernizing.” It may well be, however, that time and space are only conflated, and each represents, rather than substitutes for, the other.
2. We should note too that this sense of freedom might also be related to the absence of security checks at BIG’s main entrance. Every automobile entering an enclosed mall in Israel, including Beersheva’s Kenyon ha-Negev, is subject to close scrutiny.
3. It should be noted that the cost of cars and their maintenance in Israel is approximately 30 percent higher than in the United States.

Chapter 3

1. The *Intifada* is the popular uprising of the Arabs in the Occupied Territories against the Israeli occupation. It started in 1987 and lasted for several years.
2. Most of the Tel Aviv Arab population resides in Jaffa, a historically Palestinian part of the city.
3. Oriental Jews are the ones whose origins are in Asia or Africa; Ashkenazi Jews originate in Europe and America.
4. The ensuing figures are based on my neighborhood survey of 1990.
5. This datum is typical of all the Jewish population in the country, see Levi, Levinson and Katz 1993.
6. The respective national figures are less than 60 percent and 25 percent, CBS, Israel’s Annual statistical review 1990, table 22.1).
7. Left- and right-wing are used here in the hawkish and dovish sense of the terms commonly used in Israeli politics.
8. Within the Jewish population of Israel, left wing supporters tended to be more educated, wealthy Ashkenazis, while right wing supporters were generally less educated, poorer Oriental Jews (Ben-Rafael and Sharot 1991; Yiftachel 1997).

9. Such movements were popular in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s when the country was predominately run by socialist parties.
10. Israel's best selling newspaper (*Yedioth Aharonoth*) wrote in 23.7.89: "The rent in [another shopping center] is 50\$ per sq. m. and is one of the highest around. There are, however, more expensive places. In RAG, shopkeepers are charged 65\$ per sq.m." Product prices were quite routinely reported in weekly citywide comparisons, which often showed RAG's stores to be the most expensive ones.
11. This was a relatively low status municipality official.
12. According to the Jewish tradition, bread mustn't be consumed during Pass-over. Secular Israelis, however, often do not observe this rule and purchase large quantities before the holiday. Bread shortage is therefore a recurrent event on these particular days.
13. It is within this framework that one can understand the dismay caused by an article in a widely read national newspaper, which depicted prices in the RAG center as moderate. One frustrated resident dismissed the depiction as false while another laughed it off as a "wishful thinking," thus restoring the local image of wealth and sophistication.
14. Members of the committee were strict in promoting only consensual issues that raised no intra-neighborhood disagreement whatsoever. An exemplary case of a rejected initiative was the idea to campaign for a bus route throughout the neighborhood. The offer was rejected on the grounds of potential opposition on the part of residents living along the future route.
15. This issue was dealt with on a neighbourhood scale, as it was perceived as threatening the whole neighborhood by decreasing the value of local property (see Birenbaum-Carmeli 2000: 30–2).
16. On the tracing of these traits to the founding ideologies of Judaism, Zionism, and socialism see Shapira 1977.
17. Such disputes, which were anyway rare, have been carried out beyond the neighborhood's limits, e.g., when some school parents initiated the integration of a privately funded curriculum into the regular studies, some parents who could not afford to participate were severely condemned. This school was, however, located outside the neighborhood, although its initiators were all RAG residents (Birenbaum-Carmeli 1999).
18. These original public-housing residents registered for subsidized housing and were randomly cast lots that granted them the right to purchase a unit in one particular project rather than another.
19. The war metaphor prevailed all neighborhood activities.
20. Interestingly, following the criticism and media attention that this depiction drew RAG's residents – apparently wishing to rehabilitate their social position in the general Israeli arena – donated an armored ambulance to West Bank settlers (June 17, 2001, *Yedioth Aharonoth*; June 21, 2001, *Ha'aretz*).

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21. Before the outbreak of the *Al Aqsa Intifada*.
22. This was primarily a result of collective expansion projects that the public-housing owners initiated (Birenbaum-Carmeli 1998). These projects, some of which had started in the previous decade, included all the buildings' residents and resulted in immaculate stylized facades that rendered RAG more homogeneous also in physical appearance.
23. The success may also be related to the economic slowdown, though the designer items sold for the price of their ordinary un-used equivalents.

Chapter 4

1. The Kibbutz general assembly, Gvanim Archive: June 16, 1960.
2. The Kibbutz general assembly, Gvanim Archive: June 17, 1961.
3. Gvanim Archive: November 28, 1962.
4. The Kibbutz Newsletter, Gvanim Archive: February 21, 1964.
5. *The Kibbutz Newsletter*, Gvanim Archive: March 21, 1969.
6. *The Kibbutz Newsletter*, Gvanim Archive: June 21, 1969.
7. "Model Hitparnessut" document, 1997, Gvanim Archive: 1997.
8. The Kibbutz general assembly, Gvanim Archive: December 9, 1996.
9. The Kibbutz general assembly, Gvanim Archive: 15.02.1998.

Chapter 5

1. The ultraorthodox Jews call themselves *Haredim*. The terms are used interchangeably here.
2. These numbers are based on the inclusion of the eastern (Palestinian) part of Jerusalem as an integral part of the city.
3. A major part of this area is satellite towns and villages around Jerusalem, which were annexed to the city for political reasons. (4 dunams = 1 acre)
4. "The *haredi* space in Jerusalem is undergoing a process of growth and expansion on the one hand, and insularity and segregation on the other. The growth and the expansion are in demography and territory, while the insularity and segregation are primarily socio-cultural. These processes are leading Jerusalem's *haredi* population into a state of acute ghettoization" (Shilhav 1993).

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5. There were times (mainly in the period 1967–1980) when Jews used to shop in the old city of Jerusalem. Due to the political situation they have ceased to do so. Arabs shopped in the Jewish city until the October 2000 *Intifada*.
6. As large as Jerusalem is, it has one main entrance from the west, known as “the entrance to Jerusalem.”
7. The central bus station has temporarily moved for renovations.
8. Glatt Kosher is a stricter level of kashrut than the one acceptable to most orthodox Jews.
9. Jews who come from Asia, North Africa, and several parts of Eastern Europe belong to the Sephardic communities, as opposed to the Ashkenazic communities. The nonreligious discourse calls them *Mizrachim* – those who came from the Orient, the East. Religious people prefer the term *Sephardim*.
10. In Israel, like in Jewish communities elsewhere, some people decide to become religious. These *Hozrim Bitshova* undergo a procedure that takes time and varies from individual to individual. The man in this case may have progressed faster than his wife and is already wearing the long side locks, while his wife is dressed modestly with long sleeves and a long skirt but does not yet cover her hair.
11. A nickname for orthodox people, *dosim* is the Ashkenazic pronunciation of the Hebrew word *datiim* meaning religious ones.
12. Jews are required to pray four times a day, the time dictated by the location of the sun in the sky.
13. *Mitnagdim* (“opposers” in Hebrew), or Lithuanians, is the name for the ultraorthodox community that stood against the Hassidic movement in Europe in the mid-eighteenth century. This group is more lax than the Hassidim in some performances of modern life. *Mizrahi* ultraorthodox men are usually dressed like *Mitnagdim*, while their women have a special style of dress, covering their hair with hats and kerchiefs instead of wigs.
14. Yiddish is spoken mainly among the Hassidim (but not solely). Because it became a sign of strictness and resistance to the Zionist Hebrew, people who speak Yiddish tend to be more conservative than other ultraorthodox.
15. The National Orthodox community aims to combine orthodoxy and modern life style.
16. Immediately shifting to the subject of army service is no surprise. I (Eran) presented myself as a student learning about the leisure habits of the *Haredim*. He, a National Orthodox of *Mizrahi* origin, locates my interest in the context of the ongoing debate in Israeli society about the unequal participation of *Haredim* in national burdens like work, taxes, and military service. The best way to legitimize a community in nationalistic Israel is to say “they serve in the army” (men of course).
17. Pashkevills are posters printed by and for the ultraorthodox communities. They are the alternative communication channel for all sorts of information:

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- calls for political demonstrations, preaching modesty, condemning a certain individual, advertising a kosher show for small children on the holidays.
18. This applies also to nearby Rivlin and Hillel street cafés, which are more “Tel Aviv-like.” They are frequented by Israelis in their twenties who come to eat, hang out, and later at night go to the clubs.
 19. Summer is high season for tourism in Israel. In ordinary times organized groups of Jewish teenagers come for several weeks. On their “free evening” in Jerusalem they end up strolling the Ben-Yehuda pedestrian strip, the *midrachov*.
 20. The Breslow Hassidic group are disciples of Rabbi Nahman from Ukraine. Rabbi Nahman had no successor and his sect is undergoing a revival lately, due to its appeal to *Hozrim Betshova* and the “new-age” style of worshipping developed by the sect.
 21. Belongs to the Hassidic sect of Karlin. Moishe was born and raised in the USA as modern orthodox and decided to come to Israel to strengthen his religiosity. He married an Israeli ultraorthodox woman and has 10 children. Moishe works for the Israeli Government as an advisor on religious matters concerning immigrants from the former USSR, and manages to draw and maintain his own borders and connections with secular friends. Moishe insisted on being our guide on Malchi Israel Street, a tour that lasted four hours and ended with candle-lighting and a Hanukkah meal at his large apartment nearby.
 22. Some people light the candles at sunset; others like Moishe do it when the stars come out.
 23. *Kikar Hashabbat* is not the official name of the circle. It was given by the local ultraorthodox who hold their gatherings and demonstrations there. One held there to preserve Sabbath rules in the area prevented trucks carrying dairy products from passing through.
 24. Stuffed fish and chopped liver are traditional Eastern European Jewish dishes served on Sabbath and holidays.
 25. The civilian activities of ultraorthodox people are quite limited, since they do not join most organizations and create their own communal ones. *Hatzole* (help) and *Zak”A* are ultraorthodox organizations manned solely by volunteers who provide urgent medical care, and collect body parts following terror attacks and road accidents. The volunteers attend courses given by the police and the Israeli counterpart of the Red Cross, and their devoted work is greatly appreciated by Israeli society.
 26. This is an important fact, since most ultraorthodox people do not own cars.
 27. This pejorative, which derives from the negative nickname *Blacks*, is used although they usually come to the park wearing the white shirt without the black jacket and sometimes the shirt is worn outside the black pants. This dress is probably attributable to the recreational activity, the hot August weather, and the more relaxed *Haimish* (at home) feeling in this open public space.

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28. The courts were the only place I saw kids cursing *Haredim* who stared at them, and teasing them about their sexual conservatism. It was an exception but served to further mark the courts as a secular-dominated zone.
29. One dog-owner I spoke with told me that during those weeks she has many run-ins with the *Haredim* who are not used to dogs, are afraid of them, but tend to tease them.
30. Before the last *Intifada* there were also Arab soccer groups, who would begin their practice with a Muslim prayer.
31. He was invited by his friend G. Sholem, and could not make up his mind. Other friends who had fled the Nazis to the USA also invited him and he was trying to make his way across the ocean, a journey he failed to complete.
32. The wealthy people in the community spend the summer abroad in better climates, others might spend a week in the city of Safed in the Galilee mountains. More and more hotels in Israel serve Glatt Kosher food and are adapting themselves to their new customers with, for example, separate pool hours for men and women.
33. A triangle shaped by three pedestrian mall streets.
34. The manager of Center One said that parents are alarmed to hear that their sons go there.
35. Once in a while a poster will be hung in the ultraorthodox zone calling on the people not to eat at those food stands where genders mix and people eat standing and exposed. The Talmud says that the one who eats outdoors resembles a dog.
36. “Symbolic” because the media are symbolic of secular values, of those who show and talk the forbidden. Fashion stores display immodesty, another symbolic site the ultraorthodox community negotiates for.

Chapter 7

1. The chapter draws on material collected during two periods of anthropological fieldwork, 1993/94 and 1997–1999, which I conducted in the urban communities of Haifa and Jaffa respectively. During and between these two concentrated expeditions I also maintained active social relations with people in a variety of rural communities inside Israel, and some of the stories I present here derive from these acquaintanceships. Notwithstanding some important differences between urban and rural populations, my arguments in this chapter with respect to consumerism refer to Muslim and Christian Palestinians nationwide, excluding Bedouins and Druzes.

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2. According to Eshet (1996), about 80 percent of the shopping malls in Israel were inaugurated during the late 1980s and the 1990s.
3. Between 1980 and 1998 the gross domestic product in Israel more than tripled (S. Swirski and E. Conur, 2000 Report).
4. In his work on popular culture and consumerism in a Cairene quarter, Zayed (1987) describes a similar spread of consumption over a variety of markets and what he calls “domains of interaction.”
5. See for example Weaver (2001) on the case of the Mexico-US border region; Berdahl (1999) on residents in the former border region between East and West Germany; and Wilson (1995) on cross-border shopping in Northern Ireland.
6. In Western societies too, consumption has been discursively linked to women, and through them to eroticism and sexual morality (Roberts 1998).
7. See Cohen 1998 and McGovern 1998 on the construction of consumption as a vehicle of democratization – creating equal opportunities in the marketplace – in post-Depression USA.
8. For example, the average income per Israeli-Palestinian household falls in the fourth decile and the income of most families is lower than that (Kraus and Yonay 2000; Swirski and Conur 2000). In 1999, the average income of Palestinian families was 60 per cent that of Jewish families. This resulted from a combination of large size of families, low wages of those employed, high rates of unemployment, and low rates of women’s labor-force participation. (Israel 2000). Further, when sources other than employment, such as real estate, capital, and pension, were taken into account, the income gap between Israeli Jews and Palestinians was more glaring still.
9. In 1994, the year the interview was conducted, a gross household income of NIS 10,000 fell in the eighth decile (Israel 1996), which was and remains well above the class location of most Israeli-Palestinian households. As to Mūsa’s self-employment, in the early 1990s, the vast majority of Israeli-Palestinian men were wage-earners rather than self-employed (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993).
10. Notably, Egypt is also an important market of Arabic books, and Israeli-Palestinians may go there especially for that purpose.
11. In 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Jordan and Egypt, it practically abolished the old borders, allowing Israeli citizens to move freely back and forth across its recognized international border with the newly occupied territories (known as “The Green Line”). Non-citizen Palestinians also could enter Israel, although their movement was much more limited. Palestinians who were Israeli citizens were allowed to move between the various territories much more freely than non-citizens, albeit with periodical control and arrests by Israeli authorities.

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12. Palestinians from the PA also buy goods from and in Israel (see for example Balas 2000), but their consumption is beyond the scope of this chapter.
13. To date I know of no consistent study of the informal sector among Israeli-Palestinians. My ethnographic observations indicate that this is a growing and important component of the Israeli-Palestinian economy, and I agree with Semsek (1987) that it bears great significance for consumerism.
14. I do not include here consumption through the Internet and purchases made on trips to non-Middle Eastern countries because I have no systematic data about such practices. My impression is that while these are certainly relevant markets for some local Palestinians, they constitute relatively a very small portion of their overall consumerism.
15. A popular word that people use in this context is “poor” (*faqir*). In the vernacular, beside material poverty this word signifies humbleness, disempowerment, and naiveté, and connotes clear paternalism.
16. On the link between consumption and collective images of modernity, see for example Featherstone (1987) and Abu-Lughod (1995).
17. For example, for over a decade sociologists writing about the identity of Israeli Palestinians have been debating whether they are undergoing “Israelization” or “Palestinization” (Rekhess 1989; Rosenhak 1998; Rouhana 1989; Smooha 1989). Conversely, the material presented here shows that despite their essentialist construction in national rhetoric, these identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Chapter 8

1. The remarks in this first section derive from a larger research project I am currently pursuing on the cultural constitution of the Israeli real-estate market.
2. I am concerned here with the relationship between land control, real estate, and citizenship. I note that the state constitutes differently its territorial presence and control within the territories it occupied after 1967. Palestinians in the occupied territories, who are not citizens of Israel, have proven even more vulnerable to land takeover by Jewish institutions.
3. For a suggestive analysis of property and its legitimization through the legal system, see Rose 1994. Her treatment of the relation between property and its justification through foundation narratives in American law helped me to draw connections between foundation narratives, territorial control, and real estate in Israel.

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4. The latest example of this has been the establishment of middle-class communities in small settlements on both sides of the 1967 border; these were intended to attract suburbanites and at the same time to consolidate the state's claims to border settlements during the most recent peace negotiations.
5. This policy has not been entirely successful, however, and public housing in peripheral settlements tends to be readily available.
6. Rent controls and taxes on rental income were instituted by British Mandate authorities at a time of heavy Jewish immigration, and were retained after the foundation of the state. While various reasons were given in retrospect for preferring mortgage rather than rent subsidies, there is no explicit articulation of this policy. This pattern was manifest in the 1950s when "abandoned" property was offered for rent and within very few years for sale to its tenants; it was also expected that renters in peripheral towns would eventually purchase their apartments from the state (Carmon 1999). Such a policy has contributed to linking citizens' financial investment to the state projects of land control and settlement.
7. According to Almagor (cited in Dadon), the cost of land constitutes 33 percent of an average Israeli apartment. Note also that the land is not technically sold, but leased for 49 or 99 years, after which ownership reverts to state land institutions. Here again is another mechanism through which the state maintains nominal control over land.
8. For discussions of these experiences, see Sa'ar in Chapter 7 and Markowitz and Uriely in Chapter 1 in this volume, and Forte 2002.
9. People in Deir al-Asad mostly use the word "balad" (village/country) when referring to the place where they live. According to the Israeli administration, Deir al-Asad is defined as a village. I decided to use the word "town" here to reflect the fact that Deir al-Asad had over 7000 inhabitants in the 1990s, the size of many small towns all over the world. My intention is also to avoid categorizing villagers in terms with orientalist connotations.
10. For recent exceptions and the waves they have raised, see Yiftachel and Kedar 2000.
11. In the framework of the 1950s land survey, which was started in "Arab areas," land administrators instituted over 800 lawsuits in Deir al-Asad alone against inhabitants who were required to prove the legitimacy of their ownership.
12. This and the following analysis was inspired by Graeber 2002.
13. Implicit in this argument is a departure from Bourdieu's static notion of social capital. Neither persons, nor their relationships, nor the ways in which these are expressed, are constant; rather, they are reshaped through particular actions over time. What is being accumulated is the capacity to redefine these rather than a palpable, quantifiable commodity (see Graeber 2002).

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14. While distinction is definitely displayed here through conspicuous spending, it is also drawn by the masking of specific resources, in this case that contributed by women. This pattern of inconspicuous consumption reinforces the continuity of certain social norms.
15. This pattern is currently found in many different forms. Thus for example a wealthy man whose daughter married into a family of lesser means bought her very fancy gold for the wedding, which she displayed as if it came from her future husband rather than from her father. This was meant to enhance the status of the family into which she was marrying, and to give her leverage within it at the same time.
16. For a political economic description of partnership contracts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Firestone (1974; 1975). For a description of the cultural and social meanings and practices involved, see Forte (2000).
17. A major expense at that time is the dowry a boy's parents have to give to the girl's. Others are wedding expenses, and the costs of setting up a new household.
18. This didn't prevent Hassan and his older brother Mohammad from building homes together in the 1970s, each contributing his own savings and earnings. Currently they share electricity bills, because having one bill rather than two comes out cheaper for both.

Chapter 9

1. The use of the term "popular Protestantism" describes a broad range of religious practices with different degrees of institutionalization and diverse theological emphases, which are differentiated from the historical currents of Protestantism (Escobar 1997: 100; Sigmund 1999).
2. For a thorough discussion on the multifaceted relation between religions and globalizations, see Hopkinset al. 2001.
3. This chapter is part of a more extensive research project on "The Emergence of New Ethnic Communities in Israel: Migrant Workers from Latin America and Africa," funded by the Israel National Academy of Sciences. Within the framework of this study, we are examining the development of institutional sites by undocumented migrant workers, including Churches established by the migrants themselves. Africans and Filipinos also established impressive networks of Evangelical Churches, which are scattered around Israel from Nahariya in the north to Herzliya, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem in the center, and Eilat in the far south. This chapter does not deal with these Churches.

4. Israel is a country of immigration inhabited by Jews from practically every country in the world. Unlike other receiving societies, Israel is committed to the successful absorption of its (Jewish) immigrants and actively encourages immigration of Jews but discourages non-Jewish immigration. The Israeli Law of Nationality, which came into effect in 1952, complemented the Law of Return of 1950. The latter law, based on the *jus sanguinis* principle, confers onto Jews, and only Jews, everywhere the right of immigration, while the former gave them, virtually automatically, Israeli nationality. Thus, Israel can be viewed as an immigrant-settler society based on an ethno-nationalist structure, defined both ideologically and institutionally.
5. This chapter does not deal with established Christian Churches that existed in Israel before the arrival of the migrant workers. Although they too serve migrants, they exist independently of them.
6. By 1987, Palestinian workers from the West Bank and Gaza comprised about 7 percent of the labor force. They concentrated in construction, agriculture and services (Weisberg 1992).
7. For a detailed analysis of the political configuration that led to the decision on the massive recruitment of foreign workers, see Bartram 1998: 310–16.
8. Those in the latter category are dubbed “runners” in the local employers’ jargon.
9. While the state permits provide a formal infrastructure of incorporation into the labor market, the workplace conditions resemble a kind of “total institution,” so to speak, which leaves little or almost no margin for migrant associational initiatives. Legally recruited workers come alone without families. They live and work in the same place, thus transforming the way specific jobs are performed. For example, construction workers live on the construction sites, agricultural workers live in agricultural sites, and nursing workers live in the patient homes.
10. It should be noted that Filipino migrants are formally recruited through agencies to work as care-workers for the disabled and elderly.
11. Data was collected through in-depth interviews with 80 migrant workers from Latin American countries.
12. Fifty percent of these children are between the ages of six and twelve and attended primary schools at the time of the interview. Approximately 30 percent were younger than six and attended private kindergartens run by other Latino migrant women. Another 20 percent comprised children aged between 12 and 18 who attended secondary schools.
13. See Ronen Bergman, “They’ll come, they’ll pray and they’ll go back home,” *Ha’aretz*, Oct. 27, 1999; Nina Pinto, “Police fear mass suicide and attack on Temple Mount,” *Ha’aretz*, Oct. 26, 1999, A-3; Lily Galili, “End of the millennium: Police operating against Christian cults with great zeal,” *Ha’aretz*, Oct.

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- 26, 1999, A-3; Lily Galili, "Apocalypse 2000 doesn't generate only Christian cults; Americans looking for Jewish cults too," *Ha'aretz*, Nov. 7, 1999; Nina Pinto, "Two Christian groups deported from Israel," *Ha'aretz*, Nov. 7, 1999.
14. It should be noted that Churches are an extremely important institutional site of migrant workers. At the same time, they are not the only site at which migrants spend their leisure time and organize their community. The Latin American community has two additional sites of meeting and organization: soccer clubs and dance clubs. These sites provide an opportunity to listen to music and eat food that evokes the home country. Their primary function lies in organizing events of a community and entertainment character (for a detailed description of the Latino migrant community, see Kemp et al. 2000; Schammah et al. 2000; Raijman et al. 2001).
 15. Fieldwork for the present study was conducted in several Evangelical Churches in the neighborhoods of South Tel-Aviv, during 1998–2001. The ethnographic research included participant observation in the whole range of activities held within the congregations (holidays, rituals, special prayer groups, outings, home visits, and the like), and interviews with religious leaders and active members of Churches.
 16. Thus, for example, some of the Churches started out as Baptist congregations but over time came to be identified with Messianic Jews.
 17. It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of migrant workers from Latin America in Israel, as the great majority are in the country illegally. In 1996 the Ministry of the Interior estimated that they numbered about 15,000, from all parts of South America. Data of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) show that between November 1995 and December 1996 the number of migrants from Latin America in Israel without a permit increased by 43 percent – a highly significant increase, by any standard (CBS, July 30, 1998, Press Communiqué 159).
 18. According to Freston (1998), about 10 percent of the population of Latin America is declaredly affiliated with Evangelical Churches. In Brazil, for example, Protestants constitute 13 percent of the population, of whom 62 percent belong to Pentecostal Churches, making the Pentecostal Church in Brazil the second largest in the world (1998: 1). Lampe (1998: 430) cites a Pentecostal "boom" that has been under way in the Caribbean since the 1970s, which has quadrupled the number of adherents there.
 19. For example, the Baptist Churches established by migrants were accorded official status after being recognized by the established Baptist Church in Israel. To obtain such recognition, a new Church must undergo a tough admission test administered by the recognized Church.
 20. According to Abrahami, "there was a kind of unstated agreement between the Israeli police and community leaders: The police do not enter houses of

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worship.” However, this agreement was violated last June 2001 when the police came to an African Church and arrested the pastor who was staying in Israel without a permit. (Ha’aretz, June, 20, 2001). So far, this is the only case reported with regard to police raids in churches, thus confirming the rule that Churches are still considered “protected spaces.”

21. The family is not only an organizational metaphor, it is also a primary object for the Churches’ activities. They hold seminars and workshops for young couples on subjects related to “family” and “family life,” such as living as a couple, the family from the biblical perspective, introducing children into the world of the ritual, and the like. Church-organized extracurricular activity (welcoming the Sabbath twice each month on Friday evenings, outings around the country, special seminar days, and more) also emphasized the value of family life and communality.
22. We use pseudonyms to designate the names of the migrants and the Churches.
23. The list of petitions becomes significantly longer ahead of a Friday-night vigil, totaling up to 31, one for each day of the month. In this case, the opening petition, for which the whole congregation prays together, dealt with overcoming terrorists’ plans to attack Israel and with the salvation of Jews in Israel and throughout the world. This was followed by a prayer for the end of the conflict in Yugoslavia. Other petitions addressed more personal requests: the pregnancy of one of the congregation’s members, the cancer of another, the success of a visit to Holland and Sweden of “Brother” Lopez; and there were also community requests, such as a prayer for those who were in prison, for the children of the migrants in Israel, and for the establishment of a clinic in Guinea by the mother Church. Our research team was also the subject of a monthly petition, in the VDLA Church.
24. This phenomenon has also been noted by Corten and Marshall-Fratani (2001).
25. Gifford has defined the Christian Zionist theology as follows: “God works through two agents on earth: the Church and Israel . . . Since God will accomplish his end-time purposes through Israel, and Israel is a pre-requisite of Christ’s return, Israel must be defended by every means possible. This leads to unquestioning support, on supposedly biblical grounds, for everything the modern Israeli government wants or attempts” (Gifford 2001: 74). Therefore, being against Israel is being against God and his will.
26. This appears to be a controversial position that differentiates between Messianic Jews and Evangelical Churches.
27. In an event held in the Shalom Hotel in Jerusalem two years ago, to mark the visit to Israel of the leader of the international LLM Church from Venezuela, the guest’s main (and lengthy) sermon was devoted to the movement’s love for the Jews. The movement’s major task in Israel, he said, was to develop an approach to non-believing Jews in order to apprise them of the similarity

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- between the evangelical religious doctrine and what they perceive to be the foundations of the Jewish doctrine.
28. While we cannot offer an empirical generalization, the support for the Israeli right-wing position by Evangelical migrants is not accidental. This support was given further credence on several occasions. For instance, during conversations with Palestinian Israeli citizens who are active in Baptist Churches openly expressed enthusiastic support for Sharon and for any candidate who would ensure the integrity of Jerusalem under Jewish rule. And Christian migrant women from the Philippines, who are active members of one of the largest Pentecostal Churches active in Israel, told us about intensive collective prayers that were held for “one and united Jerusalem” in the run-up to the elections.
 29. That this unwritten “status quo” exists is shown incontrovertibly by the fact that no case is shown in which the authorities tried to interfere with the Churches as such or with their activity. According to the response to a written questionnaire that was submitted to the head of the department of Christian affairs in the Ministry for Religious Affairs, the ministry is not aware of the existence of the Evangelical Churches. This is quite peculiar, but suggests one of two possibilities: a lack of interest in the subject or an unwillingness to admit an interest in the subject. Both possibilities corroborate our thesis of the existence of a “status quo” in religion/state, which is not limited to the Jewish religion alone (Marshall-Fratani 2001).