

## **POSTCOLONIAL FEMINISM, THE POLITICS OF IDENTIFICATION, AND THE LIBERAL BARGAIN**

AMALIA SA'AR  
*University of Haifa*

*The article focuses on the complex positioning of people from disempowered backgrounds with respect to liberalism and liberal dividends. The author offers the term liberal bargain, paraphrasing Deniz Kandiyoti's "patriarchal bargain" and Cynthia Cockburn's "ethnic bargain," and dwells on the interconnections between the three. The liberal bargain indicates the particular consciousness and symbolic whitening that "colorized" (i.e., excluded/oppressed) people tend to adopt when they attempt to cash in on the liberal promise. Within the discourse of postcolonial feminism, the concept is intended to promote the discussion of power differentials among women, through refining the analytically dissatisfactory color metaphors habitually used to address issues of hegemony and ethnocentrism.*

**Keywords:** *postcolonial feminism; whiteness; liberal bargain; patriarchy; ethnicity; liberal epistemology*

In 1988, Deniz Kandiyoti introduced the term "the patriarchal bargain" to explain how women living under patriarchy strategize to maximize security and optimize their life options. She showed that women's responses to male dominance vary widely, according to the objective opportunities available under each particular variant of patriarchy. Such responses range from eager collaboration, whereby women act as devout guardians of patriarchal mores and values, to skillful maneuvering to make gains while avoiding overt conflict, to different levels of passive and active resistance. Kandiyoti thus sought to distinguish among different degrees and

---

*AUTHOR'S NOTE: I thank my many feminist sisters for years of inspiring discussions and experiences. Fieldwork was made possible thanks to the generous funding of the Wenner-Grenn Foundation and the Lady Davis Fellowship Trust; most important, thanks to the kindness and openness of many Palestinian individuals. I also thank editor Christine Williams and the anonymous readers for their comments and Murray Rosovsky for his careful editing of the manuscript.*

*REPRINT REQUESTS: Amalia Sa'ar, University of Haifa, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel; e-mail: saaram@soc.haifa.ac.il.*

GENDER & SOCIETY, Vol. 19 No. 5, October 2005 680-700  
DOI: 10.1177/0891243205278405  
© 2005 Sociologists for Women in Society

forms of patriarchal oppression on one hand and to convey the complex positioning of women with respect to power/disempowerment on the other. She argued that within the system that by and large works against women, some women stand to benefit from the unequal gender arrangements, depending on their stage in the life cycle or on their particular familial status. Such women are more likely to strike a bargain with patriarchy than to resist it. This was identified as a major source of women's acquiescence and accommodation to existing gender orders.

Recently, Cynthia Cockburn (2004) proposed applying the concept of the patriarchal bargain, along with some other related concepts from gender theory, to the ethnic context. Cockburn suggests the term "ethnic order," paraphrasing what Jill Julius Mathews (Cockburn 2004) calls the "gender order." The ethnic order represents the power relations in any given society, which establish an initial social differentiation by ethnicity, which then permeates and underpins all other distinctions. Certain members of disadvantaged groups are likely to sign up for an "ethnic bargain," that is, to provide services to the dominant ethnic group in exchange for patronage or protection.

I want to continue in the analytical direction of Kandiyoti and Cockburn and expand the notion of the bargain to include a broader political-economic perspective. There is, I would suggest, also a *liberal bargain*. Some members of marginalized groups internalize liberal epistemology to maximize security and optimize their life options. They strategize to materialize whatever limited benefits they may extract from their disadvantaged position in the liberal order. Like patriarchal and ethnic bargains, liberal bargains may have many variations, and they include different levels of commitment, namely, action, discourse, and meaning making. Accordingly, attitudes and behaviors tend to range from internalizing and actively promoting liberal authority, to working with it for short-term gains while avoiding conflictive emotional investments, to passive and active forms of resistance.

The concept of the liberal bargain refers to a particular process whereby members of disadvantaged groups become identified with the hegemonic order, at least to a degree. Despite the hierarchical and selective character of liberal orders, quite a few members of marginalized groups stand to gain some benefits from them, or seem to believe that they do. Many of those who face exclusion because of their demographic attributes (notably their ethnic or racial background, and their gender in the case of women) may at the same time enjoy some advantages, thanks to their education, occupation, or to other ascribed traits that are less stigmatized. Not coincidentally, they often adopt a liberal epistemology. Local discourses on the politics of identity are quick to condemn such tendencies as forms of sellout or see them as forlorn attempts to deny the barriers imposed by skin color. However, I suggest that the process of mental response, in the sense of adopting modes of knowing, by people on the fringes of the liberal order who face a complex of blockades and partial opportunities, is important to ponder. The concept of the liberal bargain facilitates a consideration of cultural attributes, social identities, and social consciousness that admits intermediate and dynamic states. It therefore allows a nuanced reading of prevalent worldviews and behaviors among people living under oppressive condi-

tions. This is doubly relevant to women. For them, liberal ideologies hold particularly promising prospects of liberation from primordial oppressions at the same time as actual liberal regimes perpetuate their subordination (Barriteau 1998).

I will exemplify the notion of the liberal bargain with the case of Palestinian women citizens of Israel. As I elaborate below, although Israel's liberal elements are significantly weakened by the state's ethno-national agenda, it still offers some relevant opportunities even to its most marginalized citizens. Among the Palestinian citizens of the state, local practices tend to combine a firm political awareness of national exclusion and a keen drive to preserve cultural authenticity, with celebrations of modernity, liberalism, and indeed Israeliness. This complex aspect of the lives of a national minority, which by its very definition is identified with its state's most immediate enemy, has eluded the local and much of the professional discourse on Israeli Palestinians.<sup>1</sup> Israeli Palestinian women are particularly confusing for formalistic framings, as they simultaneously face multiple oppressions but also enjoy important advantages. The notion of the liberal bargain addresses precisely this type of situation. It holds up a mirror to diverse modes of thinking, knowing, and behaving among members of marginalized categories with respect to the dominant order, offering a way out from treating actors solely on the basis of their ethnic (national, racial . . .) affiliation or structural positioning. As will be discussed in the closing part of the article, the concept also makes a particular contribution to some ongoing debates within feminism. Because the liberal bargain admits and in fact anticipates disjunctions between social location and social consciousness, it can serve as a useful tool to move from a politics of identity, which is focused on the impossibility of joint action by women of diverse social and ethnic backgrounds, to a politics of identification, which focuses on the opposite.

I start by outlining the theoretical framework that underlies the analysis, so the next section is dedicated to the interconnectedness of liberalism, ethnicity, and patriarchy. I then move on to explore liberal or "white" consciousness and its embedding in dominant masculinities, offering to treat women who adopt dominant ways of thinking according to their specific positioning with respect to the liberal bargain rather than to their skin color or gender alone. This will form the basis of my analysis, first of Israeli Palestinian women as an exemplary case study, and then of the applicability of postcolonial feminist politics across the color lines.

### **MULTIPLE ARTICULATIONS OF ETHNICITY, PATRIARCHY, AND LIBERALISM**

This article approaches gender, class, and ethnicity as interconnected and mutually informing. This theoretical position has been extensively formulated by several scholars (e.g., Allen and Macey 1994; Anthias and Yuval Davis 1992; O'Connor 1993). In a comprehensive theoretical article, Floya Anthias (1998, 527) writes that while gender, "ethnos [*sic*]," and class may be analytically separated for heuristic purposes, their ontological domains intersect and become constitutive of

each other. Bringing gender into the analysis of racial and ethnic exclusion is pertinent to reversing the tendency of much of this literature to adopt a one-dimensional focus. At the same time, incorporating into the analysis of gender oppression the complex intersections between other major exclusionary mechanisms is promoted by postcolonial feminists as critical to making feminism relevant to women of marginalized, colonized, and otherwise oppressed categories.

*Patriarchy, ethnicity, and liberalism* are very broad terms. The archetypes themselves are diverse, and their historically specific implementations much more so. *Ethnicity*, for one, is almost always intertwined with additional exclusionary mechanisms, notably race, religion, and nationalism. Accordingly, I will use it as a generic term to indicate various possible forms of exclusion whose common denominator is that they produce essentialized differences and naturalized domination. *Patriarchy*, likewise, is far from monolithic (see, e.g., Anzilotti 2002; Hardwick 1998; Kandiyoti 1988; Lee and Clark 2000; Miller 1998), and it too will be used here in a generic sense. Finally, there are many liberalisms, as Nanette Funk (2004) has shown recently in the case of postcommunist Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. In Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, for example, concepts of liberalism have differed from the Anglo-American versions in nearly all the components with which feminists usually take issue, namely, individualism, disembodiment, the virtue of independence, the public-private divide, or the claim to gender neutrality. Accordingly, feminist struggles in the region have had to address its specific forms of gender oppression. Interestingly, Funk's use of the term *liberalism* is rather loose, as she applies it to both state socialism and postsocialism.

In this article, I too will be using *liberalism* liberally, as an umbrella term for political orders that promote the idea of civil society, where people are entitled to certain freedoms, rights, and protection from arbitrary power. Although in practice, civil liberties are often granted or withdrawn according to collective affiliations, their universal character remains a fundamental value, and consequently, they never cease to exist entirely, even in the margins. Within these ideological contours, liberalism means commitment to the rule of law, to the limitation of political power, and to some degree of private property. Within this general outline, the particular contents of liberalism vary, and so do the particular bases of inclusion and exclusion. The case study that I present below, of Palestinian women citizens of Israel, exemplifies a situation in which liberalism is relevant to bargain with even when, due to its intertwining with Zionism, its gains for members of the national minority seem minimal. Israel's self-definition as a liberal democracy has come under serious challenge, as the state-supported ethnic order grants Jews privileges over Palestinians and as the Zionist Westernization project has generated further ethnic stratifications within each of the two main national communities. To this criticism, feminist authors have added the direct discriminatory implications that militarization and the lack of separation between state and religion mean for women within and across the ethno-national lines. Critical social scientists therefore reject the definition of Israel as a liberal democracy and instead debate over the

terms “ethnic democracy” (Smooha 2002), “ethnic state” (Ghanem 1998), and “ethnocracy” (Yiftachel 1999). For the purpose of the present discussion, it is pertinent that its exclusionary character and racist practices notwithstanding, Israel is not an apartheid state as regards the Palestinians inside it. While it oppresses them collectively, the state furnishes its Palestinian citizens with an array of rights and opportunities that are important in the lives of families and individuals. It is the limited character of their liberal entitlements that renders their case suitable for an examination of the operation of the liberal bargain.

Beyond an aggregate of political norms, liberalism constitutes a symbolic system that is intertwined with world historical processes of capitalism and globalization and with modernity. Within these grand projects, the concept of the liberal bargain is oriented to lived, localized experiences (see Foster 2002). Local discourses, especially in postcolonial situations, often use *liberalism* and *modernity* interchangeably, the latter representing what Eudine Barriteau (1998) has called “the enlightenment promise.” This promise of a better quality of life assumes a linear view of progress, a rational approach to human affairs, and persistent blindness to ethnic tracking, as part of a more general inclination to compartmentalize complex reality. The evident link between these elements and familiar characteristics of modern masculinity is hardly surprising. By and large, modernity has perpetuated patriarchal arrangements, with liberalism providing some of the major conceptual and political tools for the realization of such outcomes. Within this universal process, local receptions of modernity have been immensely diverse (see, e.g., Abu-Lughod 1998; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997; Kanaaneh 2002; LiPuma 2000; Miller 1994), with paradoxical results. On the ground, the powerful drive to modernize has frequently been bound up with forces that seem to contradict its very essence, notably nationalism (Chatterjee 1986; Dirks 1990) and religious fundamentalism (Hefner 1998).<sup>2</sup> All too often, these ideologies buttress highly hierarchical and explicitly patriarchal regimes, which nevertheless, being modern, insist on imagining themselves as progressive and gender neutral.

A working assumption of this article, then, is that liberalism, in its diverse implementations, exists in articulation with male domination. Feminist arguments about the gender-specific character of liberal rights and the patriarchal basis of the liberal state are well known and will not be repeated here. Among the main issues, cursorily, are the bolstering, within modern bills of civil rights, of men’s exclusive right to women’s sexuality, through the institutions of marriage, prostitution, or pornography (MacKinnon 1989, 1993; Pateman 1988; Walby 1990); the deeply masculine character of modern political thought, particularly the notion of the person as individualistic, independent, and existing in separation from others (Di Stefano 1991; Kittay 1999); the gendered nature of state mechanisms and procedures, and of state capitalism (Connell 1990; Eisenstein 1984; Walby 1986); and the axiomatic status of sexual difference, hence the centrality accorded to the political entities woman and man (Connell 1996; Okin Moller 1991; Wittig 1992).

Together with its various patriarchal phases, liberalism is also ethnic and racist (e.g., Davis 1981). Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1999) notes that under advanced

capitalism, the consumer is created as *the* citizen. This citizen-consumer is made possible and legitimate through the cheap and often invisible labor of racialized, noncitizen or lesser-citizen minorities. Mohanty exposes the role that ideologies of heterosexual femininity, domesticity, and docility play in channeling Third World women to substandard jobs in a variety of national economies. The civil rights of these overworked, underpaid, and unrecognized workers (unrecognized in the sense that their work is constructed as help, temporary, merely supplementary, and generally nonwork) are severely restricted if not denied altogether, effectively leaving the sphere of civil society to the ethnically dominant groups.

Since class, ethnicity, and gender mutually constitute systems of oppression, the liberal bargain that operates at their conjuncture is necessarily also ethnic and patriarchal. Racism and sexism exist outside liberal orders also, but liberalism does not operate in ethnic- or gender-free zones, and it actively reproduces the other forms of domination. Yet liberalism has a powerful ability to naturalize its ethnic and gendered aspects, which leads to sublimating or whitewashing much of the violence of the dominant groups. The image of openness and inclusion tends to remain captivating despite the overwhelming structural barriers that surround the liberal order, through consumer culture, celebrated against-all-odds success stories, or the dazzling comfort of mass media entertainment. Liberalism promises ever-expanding opportunities to ever-expanding numbers of individuals. It offers an escape from the grip of primordial ties and the freedom to choose and change affiliations. It also seems to offer tangible returns for acquirable human capital, notably education, rational handling of other resources, and excellence generally, irrespective of gender, race, ethnicity, or religion. To reiterate, these promises are far narrower than they pretend to be, but they are not entirely unfounded. The middle class, while gendered and ethnicized, does include women and ethnic minorities. It is demographically inclusive at the same time that it is structurally exclusive. This acts as an important source of legitimacy to liberal ideology, both because it keeps alive the grand dream of the self-made man and because however small the gains that most members of marginalized groups stand to get from liberalism, in concrete life situations, partial profits are significant. Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 164-65) describes this process as follows: "Social categories disadvantaged by the symbolic order, such as women and the young, cannot but recognize the legitimacy of the dominant classification in the very fact that their only chance of neutralizing those of its effects most contrary to their own interests lies in submitting to them in order to make use of them."

To be accepted, those who do manage to pull out of the invisible margins and assume civility, who obtain different measures of what Marnia Lazreg calls "situational power" (2000, 32), need to traverse varying cultural and social distances, according to their relative social positioning with respect to ethnicity and gender. On the way to converting their acquired capital into economic and social success, they habitually adopt liberal epistemology. The mental and cultural process of learning to "think white"/"think male" is often quite necessary, with the actual meanings of whiteness and maleness of course being diverse and context bound. It

helps the successful accrual of symbolic capital, and as I discuss below, such mental accommodation greatly facilitates the daily handling of racism and sexism. The internalization of modes of thinking and knowing is central to the working of the liberal bargain.

### Complicating Whiteness, Complicating Maleness

Third World feminism, in its urge to incorporate ethnicity into the analysis of gender oppression, has forcefully integrated the color metaphor into feminist debates. This narrative names and rejects the superior approach to “women of color” within Western feminism, claiming that the latter tends to reduce “brown” women to one dimension of their lives (such as reproduction and housework) and ignore their diversity, agency, and complex history (e.g., Lazreg 1988; Mohanty 1991). Such one-sided emphasis on difference, the argument goes, often duplicates biases against women generally, which academic feminists have denounced in conventional social science. Furthermore, through the discursive objectification of colorized women, “white” feminists constitute themselves as liberated subjects. While I adopt this critical position, I nevertheless want to redirect the emphasis on women as complex and historically situated agents back to the center and apply it to “white” women and to colorized women who “go white.” My attempt, more generally, is to complicate whiteness. I want to argue that the color metaphor, while valuable for its expressivity, is too general and therefore analytically insufficient. Instead of the category white women, it would be more useful to consider the specific positioning with respect to the liberal bargain of women within or on the fringes of dominant groups.

At different historical moments during the past hundred years or so, women’s and human rights activists have regarded the term *feminism* with suspicion (Johnson-Odim 1991). There are at least two major reasons for this. One is the persistent inclination of mainstream, Western feminists to focus their struggle exclusively on gender discrimination while eschewing other forms of struggle, notably ethnic struggles in gender-mixed settings. As a result, the version of feminism that has become most widely acknowledged, documented, and popularized is linked with women who are relatively well off, well educated, and white, that is, fairly well positioned vis-à-vis the liberal order. Leaving out the interests and life experiences of women from marginalized or oppressed groups means that the exclusive focus on gender discrimination has made feminism an exclusionary practice and ideology. A second source of discomfort with feminism is its historical identification, rightly or not, with colonialism and cultural imperialism. Feminism became widely construed as a form of ideological imperialism, despite the fact that indigenous feminisms sprang up throughout the colonized world as long ago as the early twentieth century. Historian Leila Ahmed (1992) documented this process in the case of the Muslim world. In Egypt, Turkey, or Iran, for example, local and colonial versions of modernism alike framed Muslim culture as the major obstacle to progress and regarded the state of women as the prototypical litmus paper for testing the

level of cultural development. The discursive link between political disempowerment, culture, and women, which originated in the particular historical juncture of modernity and colonialism, quickly gained the status of an ahistorical truism. As such, it was uncritically adopted also by the major counternarratives, notably postcolonial nationalism, pan-Arabism, and political Islam.

Third World feminists have poignantly dwelled on the inability of mainstream feminist theory to accommodate women living outside the core of liberal society. Chela Sandoval (1991), for example, outlines a four-phase feminist history of consciousness, consisting of "liberal," "Marxist," "radical/cultural," and "socialist" feminisms. She contends that despite the seemingly serious differences between these phases, they are unified and hegemonic in their exclusion of U.S. Third World feminism. Although "socialist" feminism does address racial and class divisions among women, the argument goes, it too is still locked within the same all-knowing hegemonic logic. It incorporates feminists of color mainly at the level of description but disregards their original contribution to theory. Likewise, normative accounts of the second-wave feminist movement in the United States inaccurately depict it as primarily white and middle class. The intense engagement of women of color in feminist work during the 1970s is largely ignored, and women's consciousness-raising groups, the founding of the National Organization for Women, or debates on the predicament of suburban wives became the exclusive landmarks of this wave. Largely, this has had to do with the fact that the work of women of color extended beyond women-only spaces. As Becky Thompson (2002) documents, feminists of color have worked with white-dominated feminist groups; they formed women's caucuses in existing gender-mixed organizations, and they also developed autonomous Black, Latina, Native American, and Asian feminist organizations. Similar invisibility affected feminists from nondominant groups outside the United States, where multiple gender and ethnic allegiances resulted in their intensified marginalization. The example of Mizrahi feminists in Israel is a case in point. Mizrahis are Jews of Arab descent, who are considered Black in Israeli culture. They have been historically subordinated within Israeli Jewish society, and the Arab components of their culture have often been regarded as impeding their modernization. Concomitantly, mainstream Israeli feminism persistently overlooked the intra-Jewish ethnic agenda and tended to marginalize Mizrahi activists (Damary Madar 2002).

Notwithstanding their transparency in feminist circles, ethnicized women and men are not necessarily absent from the core of liberal society. Liberalism does admit individuals from marginalized groups, despite its clear class element. It also admits women from the dominant groups (white women) despite its clearly patriarchal nature. Indeed, with all its limitations, modern society does allow upward mobility for people from structurally disadvantaged backgrounds, through education, occupation, and related achievements. In and of themselves, such achievements are not sufficient to undo the working of discrimination and structural exclusion. Still, openings, in small measure, do exist for a trickle of people from the margins inward. But there is a price. Those who succeed are expected to leave their histories behind. These histories are ignored, or at best framed as local, thus

colorizing the boundaries of the white-transparent heart of civilization, which is framed as global (see Lazreg 2000, 32). Should local histories be incorporated into the canon, they would defy the unilinear and singular character so central to white historiography. They would disrupt the ideal of a neutral civil zone, free of so-called primordial elements. They would also sully the "analytical cleanliness" imperative to positivistic methodology.

To strike a good bargain with liberalism, members of disempowered backgrounds have to adopt its modes of thinking and knowing. This is crucial in facilitating success for women and minority men who, through access to the right cultural capital, are in positions to share the liberal dividend. Adopting liberal epistemology reduces the friction that their particularistic traits are constantly in danger of igniting, although this is not necessarily a conscious strategy. It enables people from subordinate groups, who encounter symbolic forms of sexism or racism, to mitigate such offenses by reclassifying them as harmless background noise or as tolerable expressions of bad taste. They may even become totally blind to them. Popular discourse refers to such acculturation as "going white." Significantly, then, whiteness (the liberal bargain) is largely about subjective consciousness, and it operates among the dominant and the subordinate alike.

In that it is a form of consciousness, whiteness also entails maleness. Adopting a hegemonic liberal epistemology often involves embracing a masculine outlook. Beside attitudes and understandings that are explicitly related to gender, masculine outlooks include cultural elements such as taste, logic, or morale, which appear gender neutral but whose gendered character is in fact hidden or implicit. They likewise dominate most local paradigms of modernity, ethnicity, and liberalism. Not that masculinity is a fixed entity or a monolithic phenomenon. As several scholars have demonstrated, multiple models of masculinity tend to coexist in given cultural settings (Connell 1995; Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994). Rather, the seeming convergence of maleness and whiteness represent the close interrelations of gendered and ethnic domination within liberal regimes.

Maleness and whiteness, then, are decidedly matters of historical consciousness, not sex or skin color. Yet in practical experience, they assume a formidable and unchanging character because they are anchored in robust regimes of power. Liberal orders are particularly amenable to exposing the tensions between essentialist and constructionist aspects of social identities. Being at once exclusionary and inclusive, they render white-male prerogatives not entirely out of reach also to individuals normatively classified as nonmales and nonwhites. As dominant identities and epistemologies, maleness and whiteness govern the thought and conception of many people from minority backgrounds. This tends to be particularly so among those closest to the core of the liberal order, such as highly educated upper-middle-class career women. But it affects people positioned further from the center too. White women are not automatically individuals of the ethnic majority, since members of excluded minorities may become white in certain important respects, even as they continue to face oppression on the basis of their ethnicity. Likewise, individual women of the dominant group cease to be white women in the popular

descriptive sense when they become critically aware of their privileges. While they are still likely to derive benefits from their whiteness, political awareness, especially when accompanied by action, reduces their sense of belonging and entitlement and may well also have a marginalizing effect on them.

The effects within feminism of the process I have described here have been paradoxical. On one hand, feminism, even in its most conservative branches (liberal feminisms), has inculcated oppositional consciousness and exposed the limitations of the liberal order. On the other hand, the version that has gained the widest popularity is that which focuses narrowly on amending gender discrimination, while leaving unchallenged the normative construct of the woman, and which refuses to link gender issues with larger forms of oppression. Fighting against gender discrimination is vital, and moreover, it is getting results and affecting the lives of significant numbers of women. Very important, it challenges liberal regimes using their own logic; for better or worse, these regimes embrace it. Here, of course, lies the irony. Hegemonic feminist discourse invokes familiarity with and affinity to the dominant culture. Such invocations make it easier to identify with and disseminate, partly because they produce an epistemological, and sometimes also a practical, affinity to power. All too often, they produce whiteness in the process.

I mentioned Chela Sandoval's (1991) contention that all four major phases of feminist history are, despite themselves, hegemonic. To overcome this trap, she argues, would take a paradigm shift, and she points to the mode of consciousness that Third World feminists have enacted during the past 30, now 40, years. This fifth mode, which Sandoval calls "differential," is profoundly antithetical to the others. It is not historically organized, and it does not privilege one oppositional enactment (equal rights, revolutionary, supremacist women-are-better-than-men, and separatist) over any other. Instead, it recognizes the potential effectiveness of all of these enactments and therefore incorporates them. Through making movement possible between seemingly very different attitudes and strategies, the differential mode transforms them out of their hegemonic versions. In glaring contrast to the dominant Western preoccupation with what Christine Di Stefano (1991, 60) in *Configurations of Masculinity* calls "the need for singular identity," the subjectivity that Sandoval advocates is a tactical one. It is a political version, anchored in the life experiences of people who struggle to survive in the face of poverty and exclusion, which denies any one ideology as the final answer, therefore allowing people to constantly recenter, depending on the kinds of oppression that need to be confronted.

To illustrate my arguments thus far, I turn now to discuss some practical attempts by Palestinian citizens of Israel to cash in on the benefits that the liberal-Zionist order offers them as individuals, and the limits that their collective exclusion as a national minority sets to such attempts. Notwithstanding their proud national identification and resentment against the state, as they claim liberal entitlements, members of the Palestinian community in Israel tend to grow increasingly comfortable with the dominant cultural manners and ways of thinking. While they do not deny their ethnicity or gender, and may even celebrate them, the liberal bargain reduces

the power of these identity components to shape a critical social consciousness. It is important to note that state racism and the highly antagonistic Israeli-Palestinian conflict produce, besides liberal bargains, segregation and diverse forms of resistance; these lie outside the scope of the present discussion.

### **The Liberal Promise and Its Limitations for Women from Marginal Backgrounds**

Israeli Palestinian women, with whose situation I am acquainted through my anthropological research and political activism,<sup>3</sup> suffer from triple marginalization: ethno-national, class-based, and gendered. Although their Israeli citizenship grants them certain rights and opportunities, notably through education, welfare, the right to vote and appeal to the courts, and access to plentiful consumerism, they are at the same time structurally discriminated against and treated with endemic suspicion.<sup>4</sup> Israeli Palestinians are overrepresented in poverty and in the lowest socioeconomic echelons. Their residential areas suffer from underdeveloped infrastructure, unemployment, housing shortages, and high levels of crime and communal violence. To extenuate these multiple oppressions, Palestinian women are frequently exposed to severe measures of domestic and sexual oppression (Españoly 1997; Glazer and Abu-Ras 1994; Haj-Yahia 1995; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 1999). By and large, the state acts as a passive or active preserver of patriarchal control and male domestic violence (Hasan 2002). However, over the years, women's organizations have challenged the state to provide protection for women under death threats, for women who suffer domestic abuse, and for general promotion of women's rights, mostly through the court system and through legislation.

In postcolonial terminology, the location of Israeli Palestinian women in the ethno-national class order makes them racialized or colored. As inhabitants of this cultural space, they re-create and delimit the transparency of the liberal-civic space that excludes them. However, the implications of liberal, in this case Israeli liberal, culture for people who are ostensibly its very negation are complex, as Israeli Palestinian women also derive positive meaning from the liberal order. Deniz Kandiyoti writes, "Patriarchal bargains do not merely inform women's rational choices but also shape the more unconscious aspects of their gendered subjectivity" (1988, 285). This characterization is applicable to liberal bargains also. Although the Zionist component of Israeli culture is outright exclusive, the modern-liberal component is not. Rhoda Kanaaneh (2002), in an ethnography of Palestinian women's lives in Galilee (northern Israel), documents practices and desires of modernity and how they feature in a nuanced and complex jigsaw of national and ethnic identities. From a different angle, Hanna Herzog (2004) ponders why only 18 out of 108 educated Israeli Palestinian women interviewed for her research used the term "racism" in their life stories, which were replete with instances of blunt discrimination, hostility, exclusion, and other offenses that they suffered directly because they were Arab. This puzzling avoidance of the explicit term "racism" in a racialized society, she argues, "reflects the absence of legitimacy for the term in the dominant

discourse in Israel and a strong tendency to construct the discourse about the relations between Jews and Palestinian-Arabs in national rather than civil terms. Moreover, it indicates how the dominated women adopt and thus reproduce the language of the dominant group as well as dominant knowledge" (p. 61).

While in Herzog's (2004) interpretation, the dominated women adopt the language of their domination, in Kanaaneh's (2002) presentation, they claim it, the language of modernity, as their own. However, from the perspective of the liberal bargain, the reports of these two authors have more in common than may seem at first glance. The myriad, often fleeting, and sometimes more substantial points where Palestinian women touch Israeli culture constitute potential entrances to the privileged civil space. Although formidable ethno-national segregation prevents such excursions from turning into permanent, large-scale acceptance, the benefits that they yield in concrete life situations cannot be underestimated. A woman of 40-odd years from a village in Galilee, who participated in my research, made the following comment on the nearby city of Karmiel: "Regardless of what the Arabs here in the village say about Karmiel having taken our lands, for me it's a great break. I can go there and have coffee all by myself, go to the shopping mall, or get my hair done. And I know that there's always a possibility for me to start up a business there. I have many Jewish clients from there, who come to my hair salon in the village" (Sa'ar 2000, 334).

Along similar lines, an interviewee in Herzog's study said, "Today, like it or not, I am in the Israeli society and I have no doubt that I took and absorbed things from it. . . . My life experience is partly Israeli" (2004, 76). Well versed in the local essentialist discourse on national identities, this particular woman, a highly educated political activist, took deliberate steps to ensure that her Israelization did not weaken her Palestinianness, and she carefully verbalized this to the interviewer, repeating phrases such as "I am not assimilating" and "I make sure . . . not to lose what I have." The women represented in Kanaaneh's (2002) ethnography did just the same but mostly without the explicit identity terminology. They consumed, desired, planned when to have babies, or kept healthy with a specific vision of modernity in mind, which was combined with a vivid sense of minority. Similar depictions emerge in my own ethnographic work (Sa'ar 2000, 2004).

Another expression of the contradictory situation of Israeli Palestinians is the combination of increasingly localized concerns and identities on one hand and strong national, regional, and global orientations on the other. This was lucidly brought home to me one day in May 2004, when in the midst of a large Israeli-launched military operation in the occupied city of Rafah in the south of the Gaza Strip, destroying tens of residential buildings, turning hundreds of families into refugees yet again, and killing several dozens of people, the Arab soccer team Abna' il-Sakhneen (from the town of Sakhneen, inside Israel) won the state cup. The military operation in occupied Palestine provoked a series of demonstrations inside Israel. These demonstrations tended to be highly emotional, using slogans that accused Israel of committing genocide and war crimes. Many Israeli Palestinians expressed a sense of outrage and despair. One of these demonstrations, staged on

the far southern border of Gaza Strip, took place the same day that the Sakhneen team won the cup. Hearing the score on their bus trip back north, the demonstrators' mood changed dramatically. One of the participants, a radical feminist called Salwa (a pseudonym), told me, "We traveled there sad and returned happy. It was a tremendous sense of elation." Israeli television that night broadcasted pictures of Palestinians celebrating in the streets of Sakhneen, weeping with joy. For a brief moment, Abna' il-Sakhneen, the underdog of Israeli soccer, did the impossible. It is plausible that the frantic festivities at the height of the humiliating Rafah operation conveyed more than a fraction of symbolic revenge. But it also conveyed the possibility of succeeding against all odds, of shortcutting the laborious course of the organized leagues, and of breaking right through to the top. The tearful men in the street who said on Israeli television that the victory was a proof that coexistence was possible were not merely trying to appease Jewish Israeli public opinion. They were enjoying the sweet victory, the respect gained for a hard-won battle, and a rare moment of getting positive attention from the mainstream media. Although some took the opportunity to demand a proper soccer stadium in Sakhneen, more explicit political statements were consistently avoided.

In seemingly contradictory moves, then, Israeli Palestinians enthusiastically pursue practices of modernity, individualistic mobility, and local patriotism while engaging in political discourses of historical justice, which defy and blame Israel's self-declared liberalism. Localization is happening despite salient discursive moves to emphasize the national unity of Palestinians within and outside Israel and to relate internal divisions to a Zionist scheme to divide and rule. Partly, the various ethnic, religious, and regional historical divisions among the Palestinians reinforce this orientation. But mostly, it reflects the liberal condition, where temporary or partial gains provide powerful incentives to relax into the promising face of liberal ideology.

To tie together the gendered, ethnic, and class components of the liberal bargain, I turn to one last example, that of Yara, who at the age of 32 got a master's degree in education from one of the major Israeli universities. I met Yara through my research on unmarried Palestinian women, and over the seven or so years of our acquaintance, I have come to appreciate her wisdom and courage in handling her prolonged nonwedded status. Like many other unmarried women in her community, Yara was preoccupied with her aberrant status, keen to get married, and frustrated at the conservatism of bachelors and their fear of independent women. At the same time, she was also strongly career oriented and adamant to continue her education despite popular convictions that advanced education and a career would impede her chances of marrying even further. Hard working and ambitious, she was therefore employed, throughout her academic studies, as a school teacher and in different administrative jobs at the Ministry of Education.

Yara is an apt example of the liberal bargain, as she combines a strong modernist worldview and a strong Islamic identity without being religiously observant. Despite her potential exposure to critical theories at the School of Education (Erdreich and Rapoport 2002), Yara's engagement in knowledge production, as a

student and research assistant, revolved consistently around conservative, functionalist analyses. Furthermore, her parallel experience doing a graduate degree in education, with its potentially critical outlook, and developing new curricula for Arab students at the Israeli Ministry of Education did not seem to create any dissonance. In her work and professional thinking, Yara focused entirely on the universal-liberal goal of modernizing Arab public schools and consistently shunned the notion that knowledge is situated and therefore yields explicitly political implications. In this, she joined a mainstream narrative among the professional Arab and Jewish personnel in the educational administration and school system. This narrative habitually identifies as the major maladies of the system the budgetary discrimination against Arab schools and the poor human resources and general conservatism of Arab teachers. Since these problems are generally deemed correctable within the concept of liberal rights, the narrative in effect depoliticizes the discussion of the colossal failure of Arab public education. Yara's utilitarian attitude is not rare among highly educated Israeli Palestinians, who are those most likely to benefit from the liberal order. Notwithstanding the clearly discriminatory and oppressive character of state education (Al-Haj 1995), Yara's involvement in it served as a source of personal empowerment. As a nonmarried woman from a lower-class family background, and the first generation in her family with higher education, her profession has been for her an opportunity for upward mobility, personal growth, and a ticket to the local elite. This, in turn, has entailed significant internalization of liberal epistemology.

The discursive tone, of course, shifts with the context. Significantly, Israeli Palestinian narratives are multivocal. While attitudes toward modernity are deeply ambivalent and sentiments toward Israel are often outright negative, liberal epistemology retains its hegemony in local articulations of needs and desires despite the increasingly popular national rhetoric. The levels of acceptance of Israeli liberalism and other available liberalisms range from internalizing and actively promoting their authority, as in the case of Yara, through working with them for short-term gains, for example, through participation in formal politics, to passive and active forms of resistance (e.g., Erdreich 2003). Bargaining with liberalism does not exclude the possibility of resistance. Those who tread the liberal path may join in collective action or critical discourse, depending on the context and on their sense of the objective possibilities open to them. However, the more people have invested in liberalism, for example, through celebrating images of modernity, the less likely they are to develop or to act on a critical consciousness.

Cultural attributes, social identities, and consciousness, which motivate and are affected by liberal bargains, are dynamic phenomena. They are produced through the ongoing reshuffling of gender, ethnicity, and citizenship. To illustrate the complex interrelations between these systems, I end this brief case study with a note on the limitations that inhere in successful bargains, as collective exclusion hinders the private exceptions from accumulating to change the existing power relations. The winning of the state soccer cup by Abna' il-Sakhneen provides a good case to summarize the fragility of Israeli Palestinians' entitlements for liberal participation. For

the demonstrators who were protesting Israel's brutality in Gaza, the victory of the local team was an opportunity to savor a moment of national pride. Angry one moment then happy the next, in that particular phase, they were consumed in their national belonging. Even Salwa, the relentless feminist whom I heard several times protest publicly against gender oppression within the Palestinian community, overlooked the exclusively male character of soccer and rejoiced in the victory along with the others. Against this militant mood, the local celebrations in the town of Sakhneen, as they were broadcast on Israeli television, provided symbolic support for the state's liberal claims that its Arab citizens can enjoy full cultural participation, regardless of the hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians. Sociologist Nuhad 'Ali, who conducted some interviews with functionaries in the Sakhneen football club and followed the commentaries in the local Arab press, confirmed that the nonbelligerent tone of the supporters represented in the media was not coincidental but part of the club's policy to avoid politicization (personal communication with Nuhad 'Ali, summer 2004). These efforts notwithstanding, the ethno-national tone endorsed by the Palestinian political activists was soon matched also on the Israeli Jewish side. When, a few months after the state cup victory, a Sakhneen player scored a critical goal for Israel in the World Cup preliminaries, stadiums around the country were filled with loud, racist outcries calling to bar Arabs from the national team.

So liberal bargains seem to reach their limits, and their gains risk being lost, when they touch and expose the ethnic (or racial) nerves that underlie the liberal order. The naming of Arab players for the Israeli national team has made soccer an arena of liberal inclusion. Yet the successive victories highlighted the national difference among the players and consequently reinforced the exclusionary components of soccer. For people from marginalized groups, this delicate balance between individual inclusion and collective exclusion is deep-seated, if mostly unarticulated, knowledge. Therefore, when they bargain with liberalism, Palestinians tend to keep their efforts on an individual level and pick carefully the aspects of their difference to be allowed in. For example, speaking Arabic in public places may be too risky at times and allowed and even appreciated at others, depending on the type of liberal sensibilities among the majority group at each particular scene and on the general level of ethnic antagonism at any given period. A similar rule applies to women who occupy public positions. Their femininity is allowed in, metaphorically speaking, and at times is even thought to contribute an aesthetic added value, but such tolerance may quickly be reversed when women seem to "take over" public space.<sup>5</sup>

### **From Identity to Identification**

In this article, I have argued for the need to refine the tools of assessment of the behavior and consciousness of people from disadvantaged backgrounds within liberal regimes. I have suggested that instead of focusing on actors' ethnic affiliation or "color," it would be more useful to look at the type of bargain that they stand to

strike with liberalism. The concept of the liberal bargain, embedded as it is in ethnic and patriarchal arrangements, allows us to note the dynamic, agentive aspect of power relations without disregarding their structural character. Because in liberal regimes, mechanisms of exclusion do not entirely rule out possibilities for participation and mobility for members of marginalized groups, including women within the dominant groups, actors often concentrate on the advantages, partial and selective as they may be, that they may have within the existing order. In the process, they are heavily inclined to adopt, to one degree or another, the hegemonic epistemology, which by historical default is white and masculine.

Common interests, according to Anna G. Jonasdottir (1988, 41), are usually thought of either in formal terms, that is, a result of objective conditions of "being among," or in terms of individualized and group-based "needs and desires," which are primarily subjective. For Jonasdottir, these seemingly opposing conceptions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. While formal conditions certainly play a crucial role in classifying people as a group, whose interests of civil participation and entitlement are clearly discernible, the content of the needs and desires of actual people within the category, how they view their interests, cannot be reduced to the arbitrary historical chance that placed them in it. This theorization, according to Chandra T. Mohanty (1999, 378), "allows us to acknowledge common interests and potential agency on the basis of systematic aspects of social location and experience, while keeping open . . . the deeper, more fundamental question of understanding and organizing around the needs, desires, and choices (the question of critical, transformative consciousness)."

I find this a good entry point to try to synthesize the diverse issues presented in this article. Mulling over possible mismatches between the "color of the body" and the "color of the mind," that is, between social identities as they are produced in particular historical contexts and the degree to which persons identify with their identities, I have discussed how members of subordinate groups adopt liberal epistemology. To bring my argument about the liberal bargain to its logical conclusion, I turn now to the complementary case of people who are "white" in the sense of "being among" (in their demographic characteristics) but not in the sense of "needs and desires."

The politics of identity, which thrives on essentialist trappings of people in fixed cultural categories, despises "brown" people who "go white" and cannot accommodate "white" people with "brown" minds. Yet these are prevalent options that need to be considered seriously. Feminist men, Jewish supporters of Palestinian rights, Ashkenazi endorsers of Mizrahi epistemology (Shohat 2001), and parallel combinations are significant for processes of social transformation. Moreover, disjunctions between (privileged) social background and (critical) social consciousness occur also outside the obvious circles of political activists. Non-politicized people, who are conveniently positioned to reap the liberal privileges, are also amenable to such processes. For example, highly educated, upper-middle-class career women often experience disharmony in their working environments, whether or not they articulate it explicitly. Although such women and men may be

relatively safe from injury by routine sexist, racist, or classist offenses, they may be unable or unwilling to dismiss them. Critical consciousness, in other words, may develop through an experience of affluence and privilege, as much as experiences of exclusion may lead to and nurture conservative consciousness.

To resist the tempting embrace of liberal hegemony, feminists from dominant groups need to colorize the structural privileges that have rendered them "white," as in the example of Adrienne Rich's (1984) political reading of her own body/person. To comprehend their deeply contradictory situation, without reducing it to being either oppressed or oppressive, feminists located in proximity to the liberal well need to name and politicize their pain and oppression, alongside tackling their own racism. Through encounters with people who "stand outside the circle of . . . society's definition of acceptable women" (Lorde 1983, 99), these feminists are challenged to see racism and classism as relevant to them personally. True, the privilege not to have to fight for material, physical survival and the comfort of liberal dividends create major distinctions between feminists of different political-economic backgrounds. However, these historical distinctions need not be reified. Instead, attuning to difference, seeing it "as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic" (Lorde 1983, 99), becomes a central methodology for feminist action and consciousness. The term *liberal bargain* is helpful in discerning historical privileges without, as it were, taking them too personally. Such an attitude in turn is necessary to move from denial and guilt to responsibility and mutual exchange (Russo 1991) and to replace an essentialist and limited politics of identity with a politics of identification.

A politics of identity assumes unilinear causality between cultural attributes, social identities, and social consciousness. It urges the racialized members of society to develop a consciousness of the particular history of their exclusion as a way to galvanize action. In popular color terminology, "Blacks" should "think Black" to liberate themselves. To "think white," for racialized people, implies potential loss of identity. By the same logic, people in dominant categories are "white" in the dual sense of social identity and social consciousness. A politics of identity usually also implies that the class and ethnic privileges of women at the core of liberal orders outweigh their gender exclusion, leaving them more "white" than gendered. Against this line, I have argued that such hierarchical reasoning is unsatisfactory, analytically and politically. Analytically, it cannot account for nuanced combinations of social positions, cultural attributes, and social consciousness, which empirical research reveals to be more complex than identity discourses would admit. Likewise, gender oppression is not derivative of ethnic or class oppressions. If it appears to be that way, in the case of women from dominant groups, this is the result of the historical interrelations between whiteness and maleness, which leads "white" women to adopt masculine modes of knowing and thinking. Outside academia, postcolonial feminist politics will benefit from embracing people from historically privileged groups who share its critical outlook, without denouncing their particular social histories.

## NOTES

1. See, for example, the scholarly debate, launched mostly during the 1990s, whether the increasingly nationalistic rhetoric among the Palestinian citizens of Israel indicates radicalization and a weakening of their civic identity, or Israelization, namely, healthy participation in democratic politics (Landau 1993; Rekhess 1989; Rosenhek 1998; Smootha 1989).

2. For a review of the duality inherent in modernity, most notably the tensions between autonomy and fragmentation, liberty and discipline, or democracy and capitalism, see Delanty (1999).

3. I did anthropological fieldwork with Israeli Palestinians in 1993-1994 and again in 1997-1999, with one of my major foci being women and gender issues. My primary research methodology was participant observation. I lived for more than a year in each of the two respective urban communities that I studied and, during these periods, socialized intensively with local people; I visited homes as well as entertained in my own apartment, did volunteer work in three local nongovernmental organizations, and attended a diverse range of cultural, social, and political activities. I also held several dozen formal and informal interviews and some focus groups. Parallel to my professional experience, I have been involved in a variety of groups working toward a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, within and outside Israeli feminism. In 1987-1988, this involvement included a year's residence in a rural Palestinian community in the center of Israel.

4. The dual definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state implies that its Palestinian citizens (roughly 18 percent of the population) are eligible for basic liberal rights but are denied most forms of collective rights (Ghanem 2000; Shafir and Peled 2002; Smootha 2002). They are exposed to a variety of policing methods, as well as direct and indirect discrimination, while at the same time enjoying certain degrees of individual protection and opportunities.

5. A vivid example is found in the active avoidance by female Hebrew and Arabic speakers in Israel of using feminine grammatical forms (Sa'ar n.d.).

## REFERENCES

- Abu-Lughod, L. 1998. Introduction: Feminist longings and postcolonial conditions. In *Remaking women: Feminism and modernity in the Middle East*, edited by L. Abu-Lughod, 3-31. Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ahmed, L. 1992. *Women and gender in Islam*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Al-Haj, M. 1995. *Education, empowerment and control: The case of Arabs in Israel*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Allen, S., and M. Macey. 1994. Some issues of race, ethnicity and nationalism in the "new" Europe: Rethinking sociological paradigms. In *Economic restructuring and social exclusion*, edited by P. Brown and R. Crompton. London: UCL.
- Anthias, F. 1998. Rethinking social divisions: Some notes towards a theoretical framework. *Sociological Review* 46:505-35.
- Anthias, F., and N. Yuval Davis. 1992. *Racialised boundaries: Race, national, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle*. London: Routledge.
- Anzilotti, C. 2002. *In the affairs of the world: Women, patriarchy, and power in colonial South Carolina*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Barriteau, E. 1998. Theorizing gender systems and the project of modernity in the twentieth-century Caribbean. *Feminist Review* 59:186-210.
- Bourdieu, P. 1977. *Outline of a theory of practice*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Chatterjee, P. 1986. *Nationalist thought and the colonial world: A derivative discourse*. London: Zed Books.
- Cockburn, C. 2004. *The line: Women, partition and the gender order in Cyprus*. London: Zed Books.

- Comaroff, J. L., and J. Comaroff. 1997. *Of revelation and revolution: The dialectics of modernity on a South African frontier*. Vol. 2. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Connell, R. W. 1990. The state, gender, and sexual politics. *Theory and Society* 19:507-44.
- . 1995. *Masculinities*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 1996. New directions in gender theory, masculinity research, and gender politics. *Ethnos* 61 (3-4): 157-76.
- Cornwall, A., and N. Lindisfarne. 1994. *Dislocating masculinity: Comparative ethnographies*. London: Routledge.
- Damary Madar, V. 2002. *Mizrahi feminism*. Jerusalem: Students for Social Justice (Hebrew).
- Davis, A. Y. 1981. *Women, race and class*. New York: Random House.
- Delanty, G. 1999. *Social theory in a changing world: Conceptions of modernity*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Di Stefano, C. 1991. *Configurations of masculinity: A feminist perspective on modern political theory*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Dirks, N. B. 1990. History as a sign of the modern. *Public Culture* 2 (2): 25-32.
- Eisenstein, Z. R. 1984. *Feminism and sexual equality: Crisis in liberal America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Erdreich, L. 2003. Opening identities of change: Multiple literacies of Palestinian Israeli women at the university. Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Erdreich, L., and T. Rapoport. 2002. Elaborating ethnonational awareness via academic literacy: Palestinian Israeli women at the university. *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 33 (4): 492-515.
- Espanioly, N. 1997. Violence against women: A Palestinian woman's perspective. Personal is political. *Women's Studies International Forum* 20:587-92.
- Foster, R. J. 2002. Bargains with modernity in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere. *Anthropological Theory* 2 (2): 233-51.
- Funk, N. 2004. Feminist critiques of liberalism: Can they travel East? Their relevance in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 29 (3): 695-721.
- Ghanem, A. 1998. State and minority in Israel: The case of the ethnic state and the predicament of its minority. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21 (3): 428-48.
- . 2000. The Palestinian minority in Israel: The "challenge" of the Jewish state and its implication. *Third World Quarterly* 21 (1): 87-104.
- Glazer, I., and W. Abu-Ras. 1994. On aggression, human rights, and hegemonic discourse: The case of a murder for family honor in Israel. *Sex Roles* 30:269-82.
- Haj-Yahia, M. 1995. Wife abuse in the Arab society in Israel: Some challenges for future change. In *Future interventions with battered women and their families*, edited by J. L. Edleson and Z. C. Eisikovitz. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hardwick, J. 1998. *The practice of patriarchy: Gender and the politics of household authority in early modern France*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Hasan, M. 2002. The politics of honor: Patriarchy, the state and the murder of women in the name of family honor. *Journal of Israeli History* 21:1-37.
- Hefner, R. W. 1998. Multiple modernities: Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in a globalizing age. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 27:83-104.
- Herzog, H. 2004. "Both an Arab and a woman": Gendered, racialised experiences of female Palestinian citizens of Israel. *Social Identities* 10 (1): 53-82.
- Johnson-Odim, C. 1991. Common themes, different contexts: Third world women and feminism. In *Third World women and the politics of feminism*, edited by C. T. Mohanty, A. Russo, and L. Torres. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Jonasdottir, A. G. 1988. On the concept of interest, women's interests, and the limitations of interest theory. In *The political interests of gender: Developing theory and research with a feminist face*, edited by K. B. Jones and A. G. Jonasdottir. London: Sage.

- Kanaaneh, R. A. 2002. *Birthing the nation: Strategies of Palestinian women in the Galilee*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kandiyoti, D. 1988. Bargaining with patriarchy. *Gender & Society* 2:274-90.
- Kittay, E. 1999. *Love's labor: Essays on women, equality, and dependency*. New York: Routledge.
- Landau, J. 1993. *The Arabs in Israel—A political study*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Lazreg, M. 1988. Feminism and difference: The perils of writing as a woman on women in Algeria. *Feminist Studies* 14:81-107.
- . 2000. The triumphant discourse of global feminism: Should other women be known? In *Going global: The transnational reception of Third World women writers*, edited by A. Amireh and L. S. Majaj. New York: Garland.
- Lee, R. J., and C. Clark, eds. 2000. *Democracy and the status of women in East Asia*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner.
- LiPuma, E. 2000. *Encompassing others: The magic of modernity in Melanesia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lorde, A. 1983. The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. In *This bridge called my back: Writings by radical women of color*, edited by C. Moraga and G. Anzaldúa. New York: Kitchen Table Press.
- MacKinnon, C. A. 1989. *Toward a feminist theory of the state*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 1993. *Only words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Miller, D. 1994. *Modernity: An ethnographic approach*. Oxford, UK: Berg.
- Miller, P. 1998. *Transformations of patriarchy in the West, 1500-1900*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Mohanty, C. T. 1991. Under Western eyes: Feminist scholarship and colonial discourses. In *Third World women and the politics of feminism*, edited by C. T. Mohanty, A. Russo, and L. Torres. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- . 1999. Women workers and capitalist scripts: Ideologies of domination, common interests, and the politics of solidarity. In *Feminist approaches to theory and methodology*, edited by S. Hesse-Biber, C. Gilmartin, and R. Lydenberg. New York: Oxford University Press.
- O'Connor, J. 1993. Gender, class and citizenship in the comparative analysis of welfare state regimes: Theoretical and methodological issues. *British Journal of Sociology* 44:501-18.
- Okin Moller, S. 1991. John Rawls: Justice as fairness—For whom? In *Feminist interpretations and political theory*, edited by M. Lyndon Shanley and C. Pateman. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Pateman, C. 1988. *The sexual contract*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Rekhes, E. 1989. Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza: Political affinity and national solidarity. *Asian and African Studies* 23:119-54.
- Rich, A. 1984. Notes towards a politics of location. In *Blood, bread and poetry: Selected prose 1979-1985*. London: Little Brown.
- Rosenhek, Z. 1998. New developments in the sociology of Palestinian citizens of Israel: An analytical review. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21:558-78.
- Russo, A. 1991. "We cannot live without our lives": White women, antiracism, and feminism. In *Third World women and the politics of feminism*, edited by C. T. Mohanty, A. Russo, and L. Torres. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Sa'ar, Amalia. 2000. "Girls" and women: Femininity and social adulthood among unmarried Israeli-Palestinian women. Ph.D. diss., Boston University.
- . 2004. Many ways of becoming a woman, the case of unmarried Israeli-Palestinian "girls." *Ethnology* 43 (1): 1-18.
- . n.d. Male talk: Why Hebrew- and Arabic-speaking women in Israel talk about themselves in the masculine. Unpublished manuscript.
- Sandoval, C. 1991. US Third World feminism: The theory and method of oppositional consciousness in the postmodern world. *Genders* 10:1-24.

- Shafir, G., and Y. Peled. 2002. *Being Israeli: The dynamics of multiple citizenship*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. 1999. Law, politics, and violence against women: A case study of Palestinians in Israel. *Law & Policy* 21 (2): 189-211.
- Shohat, E. 2001. Rupture and return: The shaping of a Mizrahi epistemology. *Hagar* 2 (1): 61-92.
- Smootha, S. 1989. *Arabs and Jews in Israel*. Vol. 1. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- . 2002. The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. *Nations and Nationalism* 8 (4): 475-503.
- Thompson, B. 2002. Multiracial feminism: Recasting the chronology of second wave feminism. *Feminist Studies* 28 (2): 337-55.
- Walby, S. 1986. *Patriarchy at work*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- . 1990. *Theorizing patriarchy*. Boston: Blackwell.
- Wittig, M. 1992. *The straight mind and other essays*. Boston: Beacon.
- Yiftachel, O. 1999. "Ethnocracy": The politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine. *Constellations* 6 (3): 364-90.

*Amalia Sa'ar, Ph.D., is a cultural anthropologist. She does research among Israeli Palestinians, focusing on gender politics and urban conditions. Her latest research project is on micro-enterprise among disempowered Israeli women of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. She teaches at the University of Haifa, Israel.*