Chapter 12

Cooperation and Conflict in the Zone of Civil Society: Arab-Jewish Activism in Jaffa

Amalia Sa'ar[1]

Critical anthropological research on citizenship and civil society has produced a rich body of literature that emphasizes their complexity and manifold dimensions. Addressing the multiple intersections of ethnicity, gender, and other so-called "primordial" components, anthropologists and critical sociologists have pressed for reassessment of the classical notion of a neutral arena, which is allegedly dictated by purely individualistic interests (e.g., Shils 1992). In contrast to Eurocentric ideals, civil society is shown to thrive also where communal ties are central to the political process (Hann and Dunn 1996, Weller 1999, Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, Hearn 2011, Lewis 2002. For Middle Eastern cases see Norton 1996, Joseph 1996, White 1996, Rabo 1996, Gole 1997). Critical scholars (e.g. Singerman 1996, Mohanty 1999) have also questioned the assumption that civil society is necessarily a middle-class construct by showing the contribution of the lower classes, particularly the urban poor, to the operation of civil life and to the very construct of citizenship. A revised understanding of the relations between civil society and the state sees them as mutually informing arenas, rather than static entities locked in a top-down model of domination (Ben-Eliezer 1998). Last but not least, citizenship is increasingly seen as a process rather than a fixed attribute. Concomitantly, a notion of a continuum of positions replaces the stiff dichotomy of citizens and non-citizens (Sassen 2002).

Significantly, the revisionist approach discerns a broad range of participatory patterns and identifies democratic elements in cultures that were hitherto classified as essentially non-democratic (e.g., Lindholm 1996, Paley 2002), yet it too has its biases. In its emphasis on cultural and ethnic/racial elements, critical research of civil society tends to focus on domination, collusion and resistance (e.g. Rosaldo 1994, Ong 1996) and to undermine aspects of cooperation across class and ethnic lines.

1 This study is based on a two-year anthropological fieldwork I conducted in the mixed quarters of Jaffa in 1997–1999, which included full residence. For slightly over a year during that period I regularly attended the weekly and bi-weekly meetings of the three groups described here. This article was originally published in *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 35(1), Spring 2006.

Monterescu.indb 261 26/03/2007 12:29:43

In the Israeli context too, critical, political-economic analysis of the Jewish-Arab dialogue tends to highlight its essentializing outcomes (e.g. Helman 2002), or at least its limited potential to overcome the objective inequalities (Halabi 2000). As a result of their eagerness to debase the optimistic conclusions of modernistic studies, regarding the potential of cross-ethnic dialogue to overcome entrenched racist positions, many such post-modernist studies tend to miss some of the complexity. Cautiously aware of this limitation, this paper on Jewish-Arab activism in Jaffa tackles the complex possibilities of cross-class, cross-ethnic dialogue in the midst of structural and political inequalities.

In the late 1990s, a wide array of grassroots activities of Jewish and Arab residents took place in Jaffa, in the south of the Tel Aviv-Jaffa metropolis. Small groups of people organized to address a range of urban concerns, among them survival in the face of gentrification, improving social ecology, and creating neighborly relations in a multi-ethnic environment. Anthropological analysis of several of these activities allows a glance at localized articulations of civil society and the ongoing processes of claiming and maintaining citizenship, in a deeply ethnicized and classed setting.

Following brief background information on Jaffa, I present ethnographic descriptions of three groups and highlight the odd mixture of aggressive factionalism alongside firm appreciation of ethnic diversity, which characterized their activities. I then identify in these groups' discussions some recurring discursive motifs, in the form of pairs of conceptual contradictions, and interpret them as at once projections and a processing mechanism of the local political-economic structural tensions. The endless debates among activists over what projects to take on and how to implement them typically slipped into mutual disparaging, as participants would dismiss opinions they did not like as mere talk, as too political, or as irrational and inefficient (accusations which the receiving parties usually rebuffed with similar zeal). Through their shared binary semantic structure, the conceptual oppositions of doer vs. talker, apolitical vs. political, or rationalist-pragmatist vs. traditionalist-romanticist reinforced a notion of a split and antagonistic local reality. At the same time, they also shared particular gender undertones, namely uncompromising claims to masculinity, albeit of different types, which cultivated common cultural grounds for the otherwise opposing camps that operated in the local scene.

This dual aspect of division and communality was very characteristic of local activism, which combined a typically aggressive style alongside persistent will to work across class and ethno-national divisions. The masculine schemata that underlay local attempts to engage power therefore counterbalanced the divisive atmosphere by providing an important (though by no means an only) unifying conceptual tool. In the clearly conflictive atmosphere that created competing images of smart and/or morally justified ways of doing citizenship, masculinity was a subtle but powerful common language, which facilitated cooperation.

Tracing the complex character of cleavages and togetherness that informed local activities to local political-economic conditions, I characterize their action-pattern as a form of "cooperative conflict" (Sen 1990). This concept, drawn from the realm of

Monterescu.indb 262 26/03/2007 12:29:44

household economy and gender relations, adds to the element of bargaining, which is familiar in civil society discourse, an aspect of subjective and identity-bound interests, which is necessary considering the embedded and culturally-specific character of civic experiences. Finally, tying together the cooperative-conflict action pattern and the symbolic language of essentialist oppositions that nevertheless share a conceptual schema, I conclude with a comment on the potential and limitations of critical versions of civil society to challenge the hegemonic ideology of civil entitlements.

Background: Gentrification

In the first half of the 20th century, and particularly during the British mandate, Jaffa was the big city on the coastal plain and an important Palestinian cultural center. In stark contradistinction, Jaffa of the post-1948 era is economically and socially marginal; the neglected backyard of the Tel Aviv metropolis. It is also predominantly Jewish, but with a significant Arab minority, which is concentrated in the western quarters of Ajami, Jabaliyya, the Flea Market, and the Heart of Jaffa. These neighborhoods, which are the focus of my paper (hereafter 'the neighborhoods' or 'the mixed quarters'), are largely poor and rundown. However, since they are situated right on or near the coast, their land is potentially very valuable. Therefore, they have been undergoing a slow process of gentrification, which over forty-odd years included various twists and turns. Processes of demolition-renewal-conservation were halted and resumed more than once, as a result of residents' resistance, conflicting policies, internal contradictions within the planning schemes, and a clash between market forces and social dynamics (Ja'fary, et al. 1992, Mazawi and Khouri-Makhoul 1989, Israel 1995, Menahem 1994, Menahem and Shapiro 1994.

The incomplete gentrification yielded diverse and polarized class and demographic composition in the mixed neighborhoods. Alongside a largely poor, though diverse Arab community, which in the late 1990s numbered somewhere between 13,000 and 20,000 people, the Jewish community, too, was diverse. It included poor and lower-class migrants who had settled in Jaffa through the fifties and sixties, as well as upper-middle class professionals, recent newcomers and self-fashioned bohemians, who were raising the price of housing and changing the architectural landscape. Finally, there were non-Arab non-Jewish foreign nationals, among them migrant workers, diplomats, and others.

Notwithstanding the pockets of severe poverty in its midst, as a result of privatization and the economic boom in the years following the Oslo accords, big money was flowing into Jaffa at the end of the 1990s on a fairly steady basis. The sources were partly state and municipal, but mainly private investors and a variety of foreign donors – Jewish, and on a much smaller scale Palestinian as well. In response to this blend of extreme differences, local political culture was similarly antagonistic. A large number of groups, associations, and committees testified to a strong propensity of residents to become involved in community affairs. To an outside observer, such busy activism created an impression of healthy democratic

culture, although many local people, despaired by the ongoing stagnation, tended to relate it instead to endemic factionalism.

The Action Committee

During the 1990s, public housing in Jaffa was gradually privatized. Properties hitherto managed by state owned companies were outsourced to a private company, Gadish. The responsibilities of Gadish included renovating the old houses, building new apartments on the roofs of existing buildings or constructing new buildings on empty plots, investing in neighborhood infrastructure, and tending to the maintenance of the apartments of existing protected tenants. The latter could retain their rights for a life-long tenancy with low rent, and potentially also buy out their apartments on good terms and become home-owners. In principle this was to become a self-contained economy, whereby the private company that operated for profit would earn from selling newly constructed apartments and in return develop the neighborhood, attract new residents, and gentrify the area. In practice the tenants complained bitterly that *Gadish* was ripping them off, forcibly applying expensive renovations to their buildings and then sending them exaggerated bills that they could not pay. Frequently, they claimed, the ostentatious external renovations did not include essential repairs inside the apartments. People pointed out a variety of damages to apartments' infrastructure, some as glaring as holes in the walls or exposed electricity wires, or told of absurd results, such as two cases in which the entrance to apartments had been sold out, turning the tenants into daily trespassers. The general feeling among the protected tenants, as it was conveyed in local public discourse, was that they were facing potential loss of their homes.

The Action Committee was a group of about 15 activists, mostly Jewish women and men and some Arabs, who regarded themselves as direct victims of *Gadish,* since every individual in this group had a legal quarrel with it. Being protected tenants marked their class affiliation very clearly. They invariably had been born in Jaffa into working-class, non home-owner families. Their educational level was usually high school or slightly lower, with some holding a bachelor or a teaching degree. Where they did seem to differ from most protected tenants in these neighborhoods, was that many of them had clear inspirations for upward mobility, beyond mere survival. Reading the map of gentrification lucidly, they were fighting, at one and the same time, to hold-on to their meager apartments, but also to keep open the possibility of these apartments one day becoming actual real-estate assets. The small number of steady activists in this group by no means represented the full scope of protected tenants with legal problems, from pending law-suits to eviction threats, to finding themselves in deep debts due to forced renovations. Many of the meetings were attended also by people outside the circle of core activists, which testified to the existence of a larger number of residents motivated to fight for their homes. It was remarkable that nearly every single person who attended made a point of stressing his or her history of involvement in local struggles, either individually or within

Monterescu.indb 264 26/03/2007 12:29:44

various add-hock groups similar to the Action Committee, who had sprang in Jaffa over the previous two decades.

While the activists and those more loosely connected to the Action Committee were clearly motivated by their own personal cases (some regarded the group as being first and foremost a support group), they also incessantly saw themselves as working toward a larger social cause. In their own eyes they were the most authentic and pure representatives of the disempowered residents of Jaffa, because they did not have any hidden agenda. Feeling empowered by their activism but still vulnerable, they held complicated views about Jaffans, which were saturated with a mush of contradictory emotions, from identification through superiority, to envy and hostility. Their discourse was full of derogatory names for other activists in their vicinity, Jews and Arabs, formal politicians or grassroots activists, including some who had previously been involved in their own group, blaming them for aspiring to make profit out of real-estate deals, and therefore of usurping public trust when pretending to operate on behalf of collective interests. Common labels, which were used as synonyms, were 'realtors' (*nadlanistim*, Heb.), 'interested' (*interesantim*, Heb.), collaborators (*mashtapim*, Heb.), or traitors (*bogdim*, Heb.). Conversely, they popularly thought of the vast majority of protected tenants in Jaffa as ignorant, passive, and sad. R., a Muslim in his forties put it in the following words:

> In Jaffa everything goes in *pitta* bread. That's how they sell people. They [local politicians, A.S.] come visit someone with somebody [an outsider] and tell them, 'come, put out some loafs of *pitta* bread, olives, and pickles' [meaning: give this guest a nice hospitality]. Then after the guest eats at their house they say, 'why I couldn't talk against them[…] that would not be nice[…] (said in a mocking tone). This is how people here are like[…] Jaffans are like sheep.

Y., a Jewish man in his thirties, said:

> *Jaffa Slope* [one of the first gentrification plans in the area that was brought to a halt during the 1980s through citizens' legal struggles, A.S.] explicitly aimed to get the Arabs out of here, to grind down *(lithon*) the Arabs and the old-time Jews and to bring rich Jews from outside. This is a weak population that does not know how to put up a fight."

S. a Jewish woman in her thirties, said:

> Let me tell you what kind of people Jaffans are. The other day we were in the beach (three members of the group) and I wanted to show T. what kind of people live here. So I went out to this elderly Arab man who was holding out a fishing rod. I was wearing my bikini with a scarf tied to my waist, you've got to understand, I was practically naked. I told him 'hello sir, I am from the Tel-Aviv municipality, do you have a fishing license?' The man became nervous and started making excuses, saying that he was not going to sell the fish in the market[…] at the end I burst into laughter and told him that I was just joking. This shows how pathetically frightened local people are. If he could think with reason he'd realize that it did not make any sense for a girl in a bikini, half naked, on a

Saturday morning, to be a representative of the municipality and to have authority to question him.

The activists of the Action Committee, then, distinguished themselves from the majority of local residents, who in many respects resembled them in status and social profile. They took an ambivalent stand toward them, regarding them with paternalism and at times even outright racism, but also hastening to help anyone, Jew or Arab, who called them up. S. the woman quoted above, was particularly active in other people's cases, mostly in the form of one-time intervention. She would receive phone calls from people panicking at the sight of a contractor standing with his men at their doorstep, demanding to put up a scaffold in their yard, for forced renovations or for constructing an extra floor on the roof. On such occasions she would immediately come to the site, even late at night, shout and argue with the contractor, make urgent phone calls to the police and to members of parliament, and later follow up on these with faxes and letters interspersed with legal terminology and threats of law suites. Often she got there before other activists or local politicians / lawyers, who would take longer to respond, if they did respond at all. On several occasions she claimed to have managed to postpone action and buy some time for the tenants.

In their discourse, the members of the Action Committee prided themselves for being old-timers in Jaffa. With all the antagonism that the Jewish members expressed in blatant terms toward local Arabs, and that the Arab participants / visitors expressed in low-tone comments or in private conversations toward the Jews, they regarded one another as fellow residents, who stood in stark opposition to the Jewish newcomers and the well to do Arabs. Activists, Jews and Arabs, liked to invoke a glorious past, in which Jaffa was a truly cosmopolitan city where people of all denominations lived in harmony, and of which they saw themselves as direct descendants. Unlike those passive, pathetic poor residents who could be sold in *pitta* bread, the activists of the Action Committee took action and had knowledge. Their mastery of legal regulations and procedures (they used to tell how they instructed their lawyers on every move), and their detailed knowledge of plot-ownership and real-estate deals in the area were indeed impressive. Their caution not to be tricked and manipulated led them to be very alert, to share information, and to be constantly suspicious. Name dropping of local and national politicians, or of local grassroots activists and the alleged plots that they owned in Jaffa, was a very popular activity. Such people were immediately labeled as 'realtors' and therefore their rhetoric was not to be believed.

In January 1998, Gadish lost its franchise and was replaced by another private company, Ariel. About three years later, this company too left Jaffa, and the management of the public housing was once again entrusted to the hands of the public company that had operated it initially. Without going into a detailed analysis of these developments, it is important to note that the members of the Action Committee regarded the replacement of Gadish as their own direct achievement.

Jaffans for Jaffa

This group was composed primarily of upper-middle-class Jews, most of whom had come to live in the mixed quarters during the 1990s. Core activists numbered between 20–30 men and women, and they claimed to have additional several dozens passive supporters. The activists tended to be white-collar professionals, predominantly architects, journalists, and artists. They were usually under 50 years of age, married with children, and Jewish. Although individual Arabs would occasionally came to the meetings, mostly responding to personal invitations, only one Arab man was officially enrolled. He was later appointed deputy chair, even though he attended the meetings less regularly than others. The group's inability to attract Arab activists, in fact, was a constant concern. Yet although they talked about it and occasionally urged Arab acquaintances to join, the Jewish character of the group remained steady throughout the year I accompanied them.

Soon after it was formed, Jaffans for Jaffa registered as an association, with a treasurer, a speaker, annual meetings, sub-committees, and all other administrative imperatives that follow official organizing. Their goal, stated generally, was to improve the quality of life in the mixed quarters. Yet, because members meant different things when they talked about the neighborhoods' ecology or quality of life, they constantly debated over priorities. Least controversial were the ideas that the group should work toward improving neighborhood infrastructure, such as street lights and garbage, and that it should attempt to 'clean the streets from drugs'. Other suggestions were to get involved in local urban plans, to attempt to control the unruly flee-market, where peddlers staying overnight would use the residents' back yards as open-air toilets, to close down pubs that attracted noisy young people during the late hours, to regulate popular businesses, such as *Abu-el-'Afye's* bakery, whose customers caused permanent traffic jams, or to restore part of the lost beach along the dried part of the sea.

A strong sense of entitlement resonated throughout these various objectives, of powerful, well-connected residents who demand what they saw as their lawful rights. Here are some examples: a leading member suggested to launch a tax-strike against the municipality as punishment for its neglect (his suggestion was discussed but not adopted). Conversely, they also worked directly with the municipal establishment. Personal contacts within the group facilitated a series of communications and investigations with key functionaries, such as the city architect, the municipal civil engineering administration, *Gadish*, or the chief of police. At the eve of municipal elections, the group invited the leading candidate, who indeed later became the Mayor, to a meeting, and dictated its agenda to him. By and large, the tone in this group's discourse tended to be arrogant and impatiently imposing. Arguments made within the reasoning of demanding better services were, of course, clearly class-specific. Framed within liberal civic terminology, however, they were usually veiled as universalistic, apolitical, and therefore obvious and non-controversial.

Against this line, some members, predominantly women, argued that if the group was to have any effect it had to address also the social problems that underlay

Monterescu.indb 267 26/03/2007 12:29:44

neighborhood ecology. This position was justified on both moral and practical grounds. Alongside an overwhelming sense of power among those representing the right-to-services position, or the narrow concern with physical ecology, many group members were socially and politically concerned. While sharing the general interest in a cleaner and safer environment, they were very sensitive to the local discourse that framed them as intruders and takers-over. As a result, quite a few members tended to see themselves as committed to improving the living conditions of local Palestinians. Of the different 'social' goals that came up, the most consistent was that of improving the local school system. Commitment to this goal problematized the tendency of most newcomers to drive their children to schools in Tel Aviv, and called to channel some of their human capital back to the community. While on the surface this did not seem to create disagreements, the conversation became touchier whenever those advocating 'social' involvement insisted on naming Arab-Jewish relationships explicitly or, put differently, on labeling the issues as political and not merely social. On one level, group members by and large wanted to work with local Arabs, as most of them cultivated a liberal self-image and a romantic appreciation of diversity, and in fact considered these important factors in their coming to live in Jaffa in the first place. However, many of them felt nervous about the potential conflict embedded in local 'diversity'. For example T., a loud promoter of the narrow, rights-to-services position said once, "I see that some of the girls here are interested in education, so I suggest that you will form a sub-committee for education, investigate the subject, and report to us". Yet, whenever discussion got to issues such as discrimination on national grounds he would reiterate, "I don't care who's an Arab and who's a Jew. To me this is irrelevant." Since despite this insistence, 'social' issues were not as neutral as some members presented them, arguments whether to prioritize 'physical' or 'social' renewal constantly stirred loud and aggressive debates.

Physical projects, the argument went, were the most practical since they were obviously 'in everyone's interest'. They were therefore bound to mobilize large numbers of people. They were also safer as they were not likely to arouse political controversy and aggravate local tensions. Projects, such as replacing the large garbage containers with smaller ones, in order to do away with the permanent stench in the streets, were good because they were operational. According to this position, delving too deeply into local problems would only drag the group into endless 'talk' and delay 'deeds'. But then, "of course, we want to have excellent schools here, too". The counter positions usually held that the group should be more careful in defining public interests and more attuned to the particular concerns of other populations in the mixed quarters. These members were much more skeptical about the viability of 'creating an excellent school system here' without breaking away from the civic discourse of universal rights. They were groping, mostly indirectly, for ways to negotiate also class and national issues and include them in the grand project to improve neighborhood ecology.

One case in which 'the physical' invariably spilled over to 'social' aspects was the attempt to 'clean the streets from drugs'. In their drive to remove dirty needles from playing grounds and to reduce larceny, Jaffans for Jaffa came close to looking

in the eyes of those who were endangered in falling into drugs themselves. As O. put it, acting on the drugs problem "would give our project a social character and help mobilize Arabs". Thus came about the decision to include an active anti-drugs position within the garbage project. In May 1998 the group therefore organized a demonstration outside a clinic in Ajami that was supplying drug substitutes, demanding that it be relocated outside Jaffa, as it was attracting addicts from the larger Tel-Aviv area. About 50 odd people attended the demonstration, including some prominent Arab activists. Jaffans for Jaffa brought banners, and T. spoke in a loud speaker in Hebrew. "This is *our* city, *our* country, we deserve not to have drugs here". And later "get this shit (*khara*) out of here". To someone's alerting him that he was using inappropriate language, T. answered, dismissingly, "rude language is my charm". The Arabic word *khara,* which passes as mildly vulgar in spoken Hebrew, is regarded as much more obscene in local Arabic. Although local Arabs also use rude language, in that setting, coming from an affluent Jewish local politician, I too found the cumulative effect of the speech offensive and out of place. For T., rude style implied an unapologetic position vis-à-vis the establishment, against whom he was demonstrating. What he missed was that his style came across as offensive also to the neighborhood and its residents, many of whom were in drugs themselves. Unlike most local protests, this demonstration was reported on national television news the same evening. The broadcast showed T. confronting a wobbly drug addict and shouting to his face, "it's either you or me, so it's me."

Neighbors Talking

Neighbors Talking was a group of 15–20 regular members, men and women, Jews and Arabs, who met every other Tuesday at the Jewish-Arab community center. As was clear from the group's name, their primary goal was conversation about neighborhood life, with particular focus on the encounter between Arabs and Jews. They wanted to learn more about each other's culture and world view, as well as to tackle some of the local political tensions. It was a semi-dynamic group. When I joined them they had been meeting for some months with a pair of moderators, one Arab and one Jewish, who specialized in facilitating Arab-Jewish encounters. After the contract with these moderators, whom the group had disliked passionately, was terminated, they met on their own several times, and then hired another single moderator for an additional period of several months. When her contract too came to an end, the group disintegrated. The dynamic aspect of this group largely resulted from the attitudes of the three moderators, as well as the coordinator on behalf of the community center, according to which the process of talking was a goal in and of itself. They encouraged people to talk through difficult political issues instead of ignoring them. When the discussion seemed to be politically neutral, the moderators would usually bring politics back in, through reflecting the group dynamic and linking it to the Arab-Jewish setting. Unlike ideal dynamic groups, the boundaries of this one were not firmly sealed. The group had no particular rules regarding admitting

new members, and indeed individuals joined and left, and some attended much more regularly than others. Also, notwithstanding the general agreement that conversation was important, there were significant disagreements as to how deeply the group should delve into dividing issues. Some participants, notably men, insistently tried to push the group *not* to discuss too much politics and instead to take up a more practical course of action. The most persistent idea being promoted was to form an official association, and then raise money in order to give professional-legal services to the poor of Jaffa. This idea never materialized.

A constant frustration among the Jews in the group, who were the majority, was the small number of Arab members. This, and the general tendency of some Arab participants to attend the meetings irregularly, created a constant sense of abandonment among the Jewish participants. Apparently, this group was formed following a previous group at the same community center, The Social Club (*Mo'adon Haverim*), which had been predominantly Muslim. That group, I was told, had disintegrated precisely because they wanted to meet with Jews, but then the successive group suffered from an opposite imbalance. Jews and Arabs in Neighbors Talking were unbalanced also in terms of class background. Most Jewish members were similar in profile to Jaffans for Jaffa. They tended to be highly educated and recent comers to the neighborhoods, while the Arabs tended to be less educated and worse off financially. This characterization, it should be noted, was not categorically true, as there were some significant exceptions in both national groups.

Discussions in Neighbors Talking covered a range of topics, including the housing problem, local urban plans, ecological hazards in the neighborhoods, crime, the failing school system, and tensions between Arabs and Jews in Jaffa. Generally, the discussion tended to take on a personal tone. Here is one example. In a discussion dedicated to the approaching 50th anniversary of the state of Israel some of the Arab participants announced that they were not going to celebrate. When K., a Muslim activist in his twenties, known for his center-stage political affiliation, exclaimed that "for me this means 50 years of occupation", some of the Jewish members seemed understanding. "Why should they celebrate? What has the state given to them?" Yet others responded differently. For example Y., an old-timer who was visibly hurt, expressed his dismay at the Arabs' disrespectful behavior on the Day of Atonement, when Jews are fasting. "I take this as an expression of hatred towards me as a Jew".

This statement invoked a long attack by the Arab as well as by some of the Jewish participants. At that point no other Jewish member joined Y.'s position. Some of the Arab members started making eloquent speeches on the state's discriminatory measures against Arabs, with most Jewish participants nodding in agreement. Then, towards to end of the meeting and without explicitly linking her statement to what Y. had said before, D., a Jewish woman, said she felt unwanted by her neighbors. She insisted, "How can that be? I'm living in my own state, and no one can say that I and my husband do not want to live with Arabs! Also in this group I sometimes feel that some of the Jews are anti-Semites, only looking to hear about bad things that Jews made to Arabs and all too keen to identify with Arabs."

Differently from the Action Committee, racist talk could not go uncommented in this group and anyway there was not much of it. Compared to Jaffans for Jaffa, denial of the political tensions between Jews and Arabs was also much less popular. With all the limitations of the discussions, in Neighbors Talking people talked frankly about the uneven power relations between Jews and Arabs, and courageously told their neighbors about their distress, hurt, and fear. Although here too aggressive style was not absent, the overall atmosphere was significantly friendlier and much less arrogant than in the other two groups.

This is not to say that political discussion went down easily among them. As noted, while the moderators encouraged political conversation, holding that coexistence necessitates frank and open dealing with charged emotions, this was not wholly a dynamic group. During tense discussions some members would go out of their way to appease and restore the friendly tone, often through averting the conversation to *cultural* channels, or through dismissing 'all this talk' and demanding to take up a more practical venue. Toward the end of the aforementioned meeting, for example, one of the older Arab members said to the offended Jewish participants, compassionately, "The young [Arab] members here were talking from their heart", implying that they were expressing their hurt rather than making an anti-Jewish statement. Also the aggressive rejection of the first pair of moderators, who insisted on taking every single discussion to the political terrain, suggested reluctance to get into political confrontation. While hostility toward these particular moderators responded partly to them not being very good professionally, it was also clearly a projection that helped the group avoid facing its own internal tensions. As E., a highly educated Muslim, said to me during a meeting "I pity these poor moderators. It must feel like a Chinese torture to sustain so much resistance from the group".

To sum up the ethnographic descriptions, the members of the Action Committee were driven by a demand for justice. Struggling to keep their homes, they were trying to secure for themselves a private sphere, this quintessential middle-class sanctuary which Jaffans for Jaffa, for example, took for granted. They, for their part, invested their energies in the public sphere. Typical to gentrifying situations elsewhere (Smith 1996), for the upper-middle-class Jewish newcomers, danger lay in the street. They therefore set out to clean and pacify their unruly surroundings. Their key issue was rights. Lastly, Neighbors Talking sought dialogue. Bringing together individuals who could potentially be in either of the other two groups, their approach to the dazzling complexity of their neighborhoods was to try to absorb and make sense of the power matrix in which they were situated, rather than to tackle it head on.

Grassroots activism in Jaffa, then, in these as well as in other groups I became acquainted with at the time, often crossed ethnic, national, and sometimes class divisions. This appears like a neat implication of the classic concept of civil society, in that locals actively create a setting that, to one degree or another, is autonomous of the state and its ethno-national agenda. Remarkably, however, the endemic antagonism and militant style that informed these activities reaffirmed precisely the top-down agenda that the state and the global economic and political forces mediated by it generate. Very differently from Edward Shils' (1991) characterization

of "civility" or "refined civil manners" as a major distinguishing factor between a well-ordered and a disordered liberal democracy, in the meetings I attended there was not much civility. Coalitions easily fell apart, and collective terms of abuse were easily hurled. Since the activists came from very diverse social backgrounds, their connections, life opportunities, and collective sentiments varied significantly. Still, they kept coming to the meetings, and were often as eagerly committed to the shared activities as they were aggressive.

Discoursive Motifs among Local Activists

Beyond their distinctive foci, the three groups described here participated in a broader discourse, which recurred in many of the other activities I attended in the town at the time. This discourse was characterized by a seemingly odd combination of bluntness and caring. During observations, participation, and interviews it was clear that Palestinians and Jews in Jaffa wanted to work together. In fact, many of the activists were motivated by passionate concern for "the public good" (which, of course, different people interpret very differently), and by a sincere wish to reach out for the Other and create a vibrant bi-national community. At the same time, Jaffa activists within and across national groups communicated in a highly argumentative, even aggressive, style. At nearly any given meeting people would spontaneously split into ad-hoc opposing camps, with the arguments following a fairly consistent pattern. Irrespective of the particular topic under discussion, claims for legitimacy would eventually come down to a handful of binary oppositions.

One popular opposition and a rather common theme in Israeli culture generally, was "doing" vs. "talking" (see Gabriel 1992). It was usually very effective to label a disliked suggestion as "mere talk" as a way of putting the other party down. Another prominent pair of contradictions was "political" vs. "apolitical". In the local terminology, this dichotomy usually referred to the national divide between Jews and Palestinians, and to the dilemma of whether or not people ought to name national distinctions explicitly. The "politicals" usually favored naming these distinctions, believing that any action would be impossible without it, while the "apoliticals" argued that naming would worsen national tensions, and preferred to highlight civic similarities instead. T.'s insistence, "We are all the same here… I don't care who is an Arab and who is a Jew, we all have the same interests…" was in fact emblematic and came up in different versions in all three groups. While people largely agreed that national differences existed, they were often in strong disagreement as to whether the local arena was political or apolitical, hence as to whether Jews and Palestinians could or could not work together.

A third prominent motif was the classification of modes of action into rational, pragmatic, and modern on the one hand, vs. sentimental, ceremonial, and traditional on the other. In the never-ending arguments over what particular project each group should attend to and how it should go about it, a popular line that people used to

Monterescu.indb 272 26/03/2007 12:29:46

justify their suggestions was that they were being practical and rational, while the counter-suggestions were sentimental, hence impractical or strategically unwise.

Significantly, people constantly seemed to attempt to stigmatize others, while resisting being stigmatized. Thus, participants in group discussions who were blamed that they were "only talking" would usually respond by arguing that talking was much more important at that particular point, whereas rushing to "do" was a form of running away from difficult issues. The ability to answer back was quite common, and the meetings sometimes assumed a theatrical quality of artful symbolic duels.

The following argument erupted one evening during a meeting of Jaffans for Jaffa with some prominent Arab activists from *Al-Rabita*, the League for the Arabs of Jaffa. A stormy debate developed quite early that evening, after some of the Jewish participants, insinuating that their Arab neighbors were not making much sense in not joining the group, emphasized that it was in "everybody's interest" to improve the neighborhood, and particularly to clear the area of drugs. To this, one of the Arab activists, N., answered swiftly, "Not true. It is actually our interest to keep the drugs flowing here so as to discourage you and get you out of these neighborhoods. This is the only way to keep the housing prices at a reasonable level and to save ourselves from becoming homeless". At that the Jewish participants became outraged. Not only was this an obvious provocation, coming from a man renowned for his social consciousness and for his particular concern with the drug problem; they were beside themselves because the position he voiced was clearly irrational, and because it expressed a kind of passivity (to let the drugs take over instead of fighting them / to beat the Jews by keeping the area floundering in the mud, even at the price of their own suffering), which contradicted their ethos of active and responsible citizens.

Before considering whether N. really meant what he said, there can be at least one more interpretation, besides passivity and irrationality, of his argument that keeping Jaffa awash with drugs would work for the benefit of its Palestinian residents. Read within the Palestinian national narrative, this position could be taken as a form of heroic survival. Arguably, passivity as a form of steadfastness could be deemed a reasonable strategy for a community that suffers from structural disempowerment and longstanding discrimination. Seen through this lens, the surprising and extreme "pro-drug" position may be read as a gesture designed to ridicule the rational, concerned pretensions of the Jewish activists.

The Jewish newcomers want a cleaner neighborhood so that the houses they have purchased and renovated will increase in value, and so that their children will have drug-free streets. Believing themselves liberals and peace lovers, they also want to contribute their expertise and connections to their disadvantaged Palestinian neighbors. These neighbors, alas, do not make it easy for them to be benevolent, which leaves them quite confused. As far as they can tell, the Palestinians obviously need help (for one thing, they receive the lion's share of welfare funds in Jaffa). They also seem to place a high value on their Jewish connections (for example, they are exceptionally proficient in Hebrew and strongly inclined to send their children to study at Hebrew-speaking schools). Still, they consistently reject their neighbors' charitable gestures. Far from being passive or submissive, Jaffa Palestinians use their

intimate knowledge of Hebrew language and culture (including the guilt feelings that they suspect their liberal Jewish neighbors harbor), as well as the ethos of civil society itself, to demand justice.

It is noteworthy that the modern-pragmatists and the heroic-traditionalists alike seek to appropriate the local discourse of civil society. After all, the "talkers" – the claimers of justice and cultural honor – aim at similar goals as the "doers". Moreover, as much as they are presented as mutually exclusive, the opposing "characters" are easily exchangeable. For example, compared with other all-Arab local associations, the League for the Arabs of Jaffa, on behalf of which N. made his 'pro-drugs' speech, with its cross-religious composition, its firm national identification, and the high educational level of its activists, is actually considered a great "doer" in its own right. It is also the most sophisticated of all the local all-Arab groupings in handling Jewish-dominated politics and bureaucracy. So their packaging a passive attitude as a form of collective survival at that meeting was indeed a provocation, meant to give the lie to the universalistic claims of their liberal modernist neighbors. Their intimate familiarity with the complex undertones of Jewish-Arab relationships gave them an advantage in their communication with the newcomer Jewish neighbors. They archly and skillfully embarrassed them on their home ground. Sensing the Jewish activists' romantic eagerness for coexistence, but at the same time being fully aware of the discrepancies in access, assets, and opportunities between the two groups, they took the liberty of teasing their neighbors a little.

Alongside their shared semantic structure of mutually exclusive qualities, the pairs of conceptual contradictions had common gender undertones. The motifs that featured prominently in the image of the doers – pragmatism, rationality, modernity, and the confidence that "everyone else" thinks the same as they do – are readily traceable to the hegemonic masculinity that belies the modernist ideal of civil society. Feminist theorization of the state (e.g., Eisenstein 1984, Pateman 1988, MacKinnon 1989, Connell 1990) has challenged the implicit neutrality of concepts such as "natural rights" of "free citizens", reinterpreting them as euphemisms for the modernist version of male domination. The liberal ideal of citizens as rational, individualistically oriented, and free from the constraints of communal ties assumes an obvious entitlement to power of the few who can actually personify it, alongside increasing abstraction of the means of oppression applied to the majority who cannot. The "free individual citizens", who come together to enhance their common good in an allegedly neutral public space must be relatively protected in body, soul, and property. Otherwise they would be in no position to work for the *enhancement* of their freedom but instead would have to struggle for survival. The idea of "rights" in the classical ethos of civil society derives directly from the entitlement of the male gender to moral and all other forms of domination. These archetypal "individuals" are so obviously male that their gender is unmarked.

Importantly, the term 'male gender' here refers to the hegemonic version only, and therefore excludes, besides women, also men from subordinate class, race, and ethnic groups. Members of these groups, however, who do not easily forfeit their claims for belonging and participation, resort to alternative ideals of hegemonic

masculinity. In Jaffa we may think that the imaginary Other – the other end of the conceptual oppositions described earlier – was a symbolic female (the "talker", the sentimental, the traditional…). In a sense this was indeed so, as effeminizing was ever effective as a means to refute a counter-opinion. Yet the "talkers", many of whom were men, themselves staked claims of legitimacy, and in the process they too resorted to hegemonic notions of masculinity. Since any given cultural setting invariably features more than one model of hegemonic masculinity (Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994, Connell 1995) they too could pick and choose. In their attempts to fend off accusations of irrational, passive, or traditional behavior, which were made in the name of pragmatism, rationality, etc., people utilized still other masculine ideals, such as honor, deep thinking (to transform "talking" into something much more respectable), or heroic survival. The motifs of doers vs. talkers, of apolitical vs. political, or of rational modern agents vs. proud traditional ethnics were suffused with ideals of masculinity and power. Apolitical often (though not solely) teamed up with pragmatist and doer, and therefore represented modernist-bureaucratic access to power. However, the political, whom the doers would stigmatize as a talker and sentimental, could also be framed as a form of assertive resistance, hence as masculine according to a different ideological discourse.

The presentations of self that resonated in the conceptual contradictions drew on competing models of hegemonic masculinity. These models, which were anchored in the different meta-narratives that dominated the local scene, claimed superiority in the name of modernity, cultural authenticity, national entitlement to the place, etc. Despite their constant attempts to disqualify one another, these competing ideologies shared a worldview of essential, binary, and hierarchic differences, which in turn was structurally similar to local gender schemata of male domination. As several scholars of masculinity have asserted (e.g., Connell 1995, Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport 2003), competing notions of hegemonic masculinity tend to share the basic beliefs in male superiority and heterosexism. Notwithstanding the strong contradictions on the ground, the various parties involved in Jaffa's civic scene used masculinity as a common basis of legitimacy. Masculinity, precisely because of its plurality of forms, constituted an ideological common denominator that facilitated the encounter, or justified its failure.

Cooperative Conflict

In his work on entitlement to limited resources in situations of famine and deprivation, Amartya K. Sen (1990) coined the term "cooperative conflict" to identify the simultaneous problems of adding to total availabilities (cooperation) and dividing the total availabilities (conflict) among household members. Emphasizing the unequal nature of relations, particularly gender relations, within households, Sen sees conflicts and cooperation as resulting from bargaining considerations. The strategies of household members are decided according to their breakdown position, which is the outcome if they fail to cooperate. Bargaining occurs when there are

several collusive possibilities that are better for both parties than the breakdown position. Differently from models of bargaining that center strictly on individual interests, Sen stresses that the parties to household economies live together, sharing concerns and experiences and acting jointly, and that this aspect of "togetherness" gives the (gender) conflict some very special characteristics. It likewise calls to take into account the subjective aspects of interests and strategies.

Although ethnically-mixed urban neighborhoods are not quite the same as gender-mixed households, the pattern of the relationships in Jaffa was reminiscent of Sen's characterization, albeit with differences in scale and intensity. Several decades of attempted gentrification, and more specifically attempts to establish a solid Jewish majority in the coastal neighborhoods of Jaffa, were inconclusive. Veteran Jews, mostly low-income, were moving out to the eastern parts of Jaffa or to Bat-Yam, the next town to the south. Upper-middle, white-collar Jews were moving in, yet as the promised "development" was slow and uncertain they were acutely bothered by the slummy environment. Lastly, Arab relocation to the south and west of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, which would have paralleled the trend among low-income Jews, was effectively limited by racism and lack of communal facilities. Consequently, the Arab population not only did not diminish, it slowly but steadily grew.

Life in the mixed quarters resembled a household in the sense that residents regarded it as home; they alternated between loving and hating it, and may have felt proud and protective of it even if they experienced it as abusive. Like home, they were there because that was where they were. Like home, its social composition – in this case the ethnic and class mixture – was regarded as a given. Notwithstanding the Arabs' celebration of a glorious pre-1948 Palestinian past and the Jews' periodical invocation of grand Judaization schemes, in practical reality dreams of national homogeneity were kept at bay, because they seemed immaterial, because each of the two national communities was internally divided, and because they shared the need to struggle against serious problems of drug trafficking and violent crime. Within the grossly unequal "entitlement system" (Sen ibid.), those who could not leave, those who found it more conducive to stay, and those who found it profitable to join in, oscillated between adding to- and dividing total availabilities. Instead of opting for the breakdown position, social activists enacted and experienced a mixture of conflictive and cooperative strategies.

Not that essentialist sentiments were absent in Jaffa. In separate all-Arab or all-Jewish activities in these same neighborhoods, the tone and rhetoric all too often were explicitly nationalistic and racist. Yet the activities described in this paper, with their diverse discursive engagements in social divisions, testify that such a tone was not exclusive.

Jaffa's emergence as a space of (limited and localized) ethno-national cooperation is not unique. The mixed quarters of Haifa too feature cross-ethnic interactions and organizing (Falah, et al. 2000). At the same time, it *is* remarkably different from other mixed settings in Israel, such as Natzerat Illit (Rabinowitz 1992), or Jerusalem, where the dominant Zionist attitudes exert pressure toward zero-sum spatial domination.

The breakdown position, in which residents choose conflict over cooperation, varies between different localities, even in a small country like Israel. Dan Rabinowitz (1992), who worked on Arab-Jewish urban relations, has marked *hityashvut* (pioneering Zionist settlement) as the factor that decides in what areas the Jews will tolerate or reject Arab presence. The more a place qualifies as having been transformed by Zionist agents, he argues, the more likely its Jewish residents are to attempt to defend it from foreign presence. Rabinowitz's analysis seems to work well also in the case of Jaffa, where the tolerance that local Jews evince of the Arab presence may well be the result of the historical failure to transform the coastal quarters of Jaffa and make them exclusively Jewish. Indeed, in the eastern and southern neighborhoods, where traces of Palestinian history have been much more effectively eliminated, anti-Arab sentiments, as mentioned, prevent their mass settlement.

Beyond passive tolerance, cross-ethnic, cross-class activism of the kind presented here brings forth the active aspects of citizenship and civil society. Sen's concept of cooperative conflict, which originates in the context of household economy, where unequal gender relations are set in an intense experience of living together, highlights the subjective constructions of interests and entitlements. Applying this concept to the phenomenon of civil activism facilitates the consideration of aspects such as identity, culture, and similar meaning-mediating factors. It therefore complicates the notion of bargaining, which is central in the classic discourse of civil society.

Conclusion

At the end of the day, social relations in Jaffa are decisively non-egalitarian. The activities of the local residents, tireless and vibrant as they were, seemed to go in circles, as the area did not appear able to take off. Concrete achievements, when registered, were mostly consistent with the preliminary division of power. Some Jewish protected tenants, who were involved in the Action Committee, indeed managed to purchase their houses, improve them, and occasionally even make a profit from them. Other Jews, newcomers and better off to begin with, succeeded in striking good real-estate deals. On the Arab side fewer managed to improve their situation, and many more remain entrenched. Overall, the area remained difficult to live in, littered with dirt and drugs, its streets unpaved and grimy, and violence of all types, criminal, architectural, national, and social, hanging in the air.

The thematic contradictions that characterized the residents' discourse reflected a civic experience of interlocked opposing forces. People worked together because they had to, but partly also because they wanted to. They mistrusted and patronized one another, yet at the same time they were mutually attracted. They were passionately caring and highly aggressive. The conceptual dichotomies of "doers vs. talkers", "politicals vs. apoliticals", and "pragmatic-rationalists vs. ceremonial-sentimentalists" resonated with the social and national divisions 'on the ground', without being direct translations of them. This quality of talking around

something without naming it explicitly rendered the conceptual oppositions mid-way articulations of charged relationships. While they did not resolve the political-economic tensions, they did mitigate them. They helped the participants incorporate these relationships into their civic activism without becoming paralyzed by them, and made possible cooperation within a structurally conflictive situation.

Lastly, the material presented clearly reinforces the critical approach to civil society in several respects. It demonstrates how the intersections between ethno-national and class divisions produce polyglot citizenship (Rosaldo 1994). Treating citizenship as a project of subject-making (Ong 1996), it highlights how people in different positioning within the official power structure act to acquire presence (Sassen 2002). And it unravels some of the gender symbolism that underlies a construct that pretends to be gender-neutral. Yet alongside the seemingly obvious ways in which this case exposes the biases and limitations of the classical ideal, it actually also shows the strong grip that this ideal retains in local understandings. The gender schema that underlay the pairs of contradictions provided them with a common language, as all parties claimed masculinity and rejected being put in the feminine position. To reiterate, in their popular tendency to belittle whoever disagrees with them, using labels like "talkers", "sentimental", and the like, activists utilized ideals of masculinity – namely natural superiority – in order to claim legitimacy. This is an underlying logic also of the classic concept of civil society itself. The ethos of "individual rights" based on the natural entitlement of these "individuals" to freedom and power is, in fact, hegemonic masculinity in disguise. It is therefore striking that despite the challenge that local activism posed for the classical ideal of civil society, the language of masculinity that belies this ideal prevailed also in its counter-hegemonic, ethnic versions. In the civic zone of Jaffa, Jews and Arabs cooperated and acted together, and all of them wanted to make sure that they came out of these encounters as "real men".

References Cited

Ben-Eliezer, Uri 1998 State versus civil society? A non-binary model of domination through the example of Israel. Journal of Historical Sociology 11(3):370–396.

Comaroff, John, and Comaroff Jean, eds. 1999 Civil Society and the political imagination in Africa: critical perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Connell, R.W. 1990 The state, gender, and sexual politics. Theory and Society 19:507–544.

—— 1995 Masculinities. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cornwall, Andrea, and Nancy Lindisfarne, eds. 1994 Dislocating masculinity: comparative ethnographies. New York and London: Routledge.

Eisenstein, Zila R. 1984 The relative autonomy of the capitalist patriarchal state. *In* Feminism and sexual equality: crisis in liberal America. Pp. 87–113. New York: Monthly Review.

Falah, Ghazi, Michael Hoy, and Rakhal Sarker 2000 Co-existence in selected mixed Arab-Jewish cities in Israel: By choice or by default? Urban Studies 37(4):775–796.

Gabriel, Ayala 1992 Rage and Grief: Collective Emotions in the Politics of Peace and the Politics of Gender in Israel. Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry 16:311–335.

Gole, Nilufer 1997 The gendered nature of the public sphere. Public Culture 10(1):61–81.

Halabi, Rabah, ed. 2000 Idnetities in Dialogue; Arab-Jewish Encounters in Wahat al-Salam/Neve-Shalom. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad.

Hann, Chris, and Elizabeth Dunn 1996 Civil society: challenging western models. London and NY: Routledge.

Hearn, Jonathan 2001 Taking liberties: Contensting visions of the civil society project. Critique of Anthropology 21(4):339–360.

Helman, Sara 2002 Monologic Results of Dialogue: Jewish-Palestinian Encounter Groups as Sites of Essentialization. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 9(3):327–354.

Israel, State Comptroller's Office 1995 Renewal of the neighborhood of ´Ajami in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa. Annual report for the fiscal year 1994 and the accounts of the fiscal year 1993 (Duah mevakeret hamedina):45.

Ja'fary, Kamal , Hadas Lahav, and Asaf Adib 1992 Jaffa in the face of the new Judaization plan (yafa fi muwajahat almukhatat al-tahwidi al-jadid). Jerusalem: Sharara Publishing. (Arabic).

Joseph, Suad, ed. 1996 Gender and citizenship in Middle Eastern states. Volume 26 (1) January–March.

Lewis, David 2002 Civil society in African contexts: Reflections on the usefulness of a concept. Development and Change 33(2):569–586.

Lindholm, Charles 1996 Despotism and democracy: State and society in the premodern Middle East. *In* The social philosophy of Ernest Gelner. J.A. Hall and I.C. Jarvie, eds. Pp. 329–355. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Lomsky-Feder, Edna, and Tamar Rapoport 2003 Juggling models of masculinity: Russian-Jewish immigrants in the Israeli army. Sociological Inquiry 73(1): 114–137.

MacKinnon, Carole A. 1989 Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mazawi, Andre E., and Makram Khouri-Makhoul 1989 Spatial policy in Jaffa, 1948–1990. *In* City and Utopia (´ir ve`utopiya). H. Luski, ed. Pp. 62–74. Tel Aviv: Israeli Publishing Company(Hebrew).

Menahem, Gila 1994 Urban regimes and neighborhood mobilization against urban redevelopment: the case of an Arab-Jewish neighborhood in Israel. Journal of Urban Affairs 16:35–50.

Menahem, Gila, and Shimon Shapiro 1994 Politics, bureaucracy, and letting residents participate in the project for neighborhoods' renewal. State, Government, and International Relations (medina, mimshal, ve-yehasim beinleumiyim) 39: 135–169 (Hebrew).

Monterescu.indb 279 26/03/2007 12:29:48

Mohanty, Chandra T. 1999 Women workers and capitalist scripts. In *Feminist Approaches to Theory and Methodology*. S. Hesse-Biber, C. Gilmartin, and R. Lydenberg, eds. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norton, Augustus R.(ed) 1996 Civil society in the Middle East. Leiden: Brill.

Ong, Aihwa 1996 Cultural citizenship as subject-making; immigrants negotiate racial and cultural boundaries in the United States. Current Anthropology 37(5): 737–762.

Paley, Julia 2002 Toward an anthropology of democracy. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31:469–496.

Pateman, Carole 1988 *The Sexual Contract*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Rabinowitz, Dan 1992 An acre is an acre is an acre? Differentiated attitudes to social space and territory on the Jewish-Arab urban frontier in Israel. *Urban Anthropology* 21:67–89.

Rabo, Annika 1996 Gender, state and civil society in Jordan and Syria. *In* Civil Society, Challenging Western Models. C. Hann and E. Dunn, eds. pp. 155–177. London and New York: Routledge.

Rosaldo, Renato 1994 Cultural citizenship and educational democracy. *Cultural Anthropology* 9(3):402–411.

Sassen, Saskia 2002 The repositioning of citizenship: Emergent subjects and spaces for politics. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 46:4–26.

Sen, Amartya K. 1990 Gender and cooperative conflict. In *Persistent Inequalities; Women and World Development*. I. Tinker, ed. Pp. 123–149. NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shils, Edward 1992 The virtue of civil society. Government and opposition 26: 3–20.

Singerman, Diane 1996 The family and community as politics: the popular sector in Cairo. In *Development, Change, and Gender in Cairo*. D. Singerman and H. Hoodfar, eds. Pp. 145–189. Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press.

Smith, Neil 1996 The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City. London: Routledge.

Weller, Robert P. 1999 *Alternative Civilities Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

White, Jenny B. 1996 Civic culture and Islam in urban Turkey. In *Civil Society, Challenging Western Models*. C. Hann and E. Dunn, eds. Pp. 143–154. London and NY: Routledge.

Monterescu.indb 280 26/03/2007 12:29:48